Administrative Hearing Defense Manual

A plain-language guide, with examples

Informational purposes only; not legal advice.

The county's authority — and its limits on farm land

A common and fair question from agricultural landowners is: what gives Miami-Dade County, through DERM and Chapter 24, the power to treat farmed, agriculturally classified land as a regulated wetland? There are two parts to the answer — where the county says its power comes from, and the state-law limits on that power for bona fide farms.

Where the county's power comes from

• The Home Rule Charter. Chapter 24 is the county's own Environmental Protection Ordinance, and its text says it is enacted under the Home Rule Charter of Miami-Dade County. Under home rule, the county has broad power to pass ordinances for public health, safety, and welfare — including environmental protection — as long as they do not conflict with general state law.
• Chapter 24 and DERM. The ordinance itself creates DERM and the Environmental Quality Control Board, defines "wetland" and related terms, and sets up the permit classes, including the Class IV wetland permit in Section 24-48. This ordinance — not the word "wetland" by itself — is what the county relies on for authority.
• Recognition of local programs. State law also allows counties to run local environmental and pollution-control programs, and some DERM programs are separately delegated by the state or federal government. But the Class IV wetland program is primarily a local, home-rule program. Because a state Environmental Resource Permit is a different thing (see Agricultural exemptions), the county should be required to say exactly which authority it is using: local Chapter 24, delegated state authority, or both.
• Chapter 24 does not claim to override state law. The ordinance says it is not intended to supersede or conflict with state environmental law, but to assist it. That matters, because where a state statute limits local regulation, the ordinance, by its own terms, should not be enforced in a way that conflicts with the state law.

The limits: state law restricts local regulation of bona fide farms

Home rule is broad, but it is not unlimited. The Florida Legislature has specifically limited what counties may do to bona fide farm operations on agriculturally classified land. Two statutes are central:

• The Agricultural Lands and Practices Act (Section 163.3162). A county may not use any of its powers to adopt or enforce any ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits, restricts, regulates, or otherwise limits an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified agricultural under Section 193.461, if that activity is either (1) regulated through adopted state best management practices, interim measures, or rules of FDEP, FDACS, or a water management district, or (2) expressly regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
• The Right to Farm Act (Section 823.14(6)). A parallel limit whose stated purpose is to eliminate duplicate regulation of farm operations. A local government may not adopt any ordinance, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on Section 193.461 land where that activity is regulated through adopted state best management practices or interim measures. This limit was strengthened in 2021.

Put simply: for a genuine farm on agriculturally classified land, where the farming activity is already covered by state best management practices or is expressly regulated by a federal agency, these statutes say the county generally may not separately restrict that same activity. Combined with the Section 373.406(2) Environmental Resource Permit exemption, this is the central argument that ordinary agriculture on classified land is not the county's to regulate.

What these limits do not automatically win

• They are conditional. They protect an activity only when it is (a) part of a bona fide farm operation, (b) on Section 193.461 land, and (c) covered by adopted state best management practices or expressly regulated by USDA, the Army Corps, or the EPA. If the activity is not covered by best management practices and not expressly federally regulated, the county may still be able to regulate it.
• New conversion is different from ordinary farming. Clearing new ground, importing fill, or draining a wetland to put it into a new use may not count as a protected activity of a bona fide farm operation, and may fall outside both the exemption and these limits.
• Federal coverage depends on federal jurisdiction. The federal-agency point only helps if the Army Corps (or another federal agency) actually regulates that water, and federal wetland jurisdiction has narrowed in recent years. Do not assume it applies without checking.
• Authority is separate from proof. Even where the county has authority, it must still prove the area is a wetland under the Chapter 62-340 method and prove the exact regulated act. Winning or losing the authority question does not decide the delineation question.

Useful term. Preemption. When state or federal law limits or takes over an area of regulation, a local government's conflicting rule cannot be enforced. Here, state statutes limit county regulation of bona fide farm activities on agriculturally classified land that are already covered by state best management practices or federal regulation.

The Environmental Resource Permit-delegation and wetland-definition arguments

Agricultural landowners often ask an important question: if the state (FDEP or the water management district) never delegated Environmental Resource Permit authority to the county, how can the county classify a wetland on their agricultural land? This is a fair question, but the answer is not the one people usually expect. Used correctly, the delegation point is still valuable; used incorrectly, it can fail.

Why "no Environmental Resource Permit delegation" does not, by itself, defeat the county

The county's power to identify a wetland and require a Class IV permit does not come from delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority. It comes from the county's own Chapter 24 ordinance, under home rule (see the previous section). The county's own permit materials say this plainly: a Class IV permit is required for work in wetlands under Chapter 24-48, and permits from the state and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers "may also be required." In other words, Class IV is a separate local requirement that applies in addition to the state Environmental Resource Permit and the federal permit — not a program that depends on any of them. So even if FDEP and the water management district never delegated Environmental Resource Permit authority to the county, the county can still apply its own Class IV wetland program. The argument "you have no Environmental Resource Permit delegation, therefore you cannot call this a wetland" usually does not work, because the county is not relying on Environmental Resource Permit authority in the first place.

Where the delegation point is still useful

• Make the county name its authority. Require the county to state clearly whether it is proceeding under its own Chapter 24 (home rule) or under delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority. If the notice, the witness, or the final order relies on state Environmental Resource Permit (for example, Chapter 373 or F.A.C. 62-330), then the county must produce the delegation instrument. If it cannot, that Environmental Resource Permit-based theory is unsupported and should be challenged.
• Get the instrument, or confirm there is none. Whether any delegation or operating agreement exists is a fact you can check — request it in a public records request, and check the state environmental agency's published delegations and operating agreements. Do not assume; make the record show exactly what authority the county has.

The stronger argument: the statewide wetland definition and method

There is a related point that is often more powerful. Florida law (Section 373.421) established a single statewide wetland definition and a single delineation method (Chapter 62-340). By statute, that definition and method are binding on the state, the water management districts, and local governments — and the Legislature preempted any local government from adopting its own wetland definition or its own delineation method.

This has two implications for a landowner:

• It explains how the county can identify a wetland without Environmental Resource Permit delegation: the county applies the mandatory statewide definition and the Chapter 62-340 method under its own ordinance. It does not need delegated Environmental Resource Permit authority to do that.
• But it also limits the county: the county must use the statewide wetland definition and the Chapter 62-340 method. If the county uses a broader local definition of "wetland," or a method other than Chapter 62-340, that is preempted, and you can challenge it. This is why the methodology demand (see Chapters 5 and 13) matters so much: the county is required to use the state method, and must prove it did.

Summary of the arguments

For a bona fide farm on agriculturally classified land, the strongest position is not a single "no delegation" argument. It is several separate points, each of which the county must answer:

• Authority. State your exact authority — local Chapter 24 or delegated state Environmental Resource Permit — and, if Environmental Resource Permit, produce the delegation.
• Definition and method. Use the statewide wetland definition and the Chapter 62-340 method, not a broader local definition, and prove it.
• Exemption and preemption. Ordinary, normal-and-customary farming on classified land is exempt from the state Environmental Resource Permit under Section 373.406(2), and the county's regulation of bona fide farm activity is limited by Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6).
• Proof of the act. Prove the exact regulated act — what was done, when, where, and by whom — not just the presence of a wetland.

Useful term. Home rule vs. delegated authority. Home-rule authority is the county's own power to pass ordinances. Delegated authority is power the state gives to the county to run a state program, such as Environmental Resource Permit. The county's Class IV wetland program is home-rule; it is not the same as delegated state Environmental Resource Permit, and the two should not be treated as if they were.

When DERM admits it is using Chapter 24 plus F.A.C. 62-340

Sometimes, when pressed to identify its authority, DERM will state plainly that it is acting under the county's home-rule Chapter 24 (the Class IV permit) and is using the F.A.C. 62-340 method — which comes from Florida Statute Chapter 373 (Section 373.421) — to identify the wetland. This is a common and important admission. Here is what it means, and what it does and does not do for a farmer.

This combination is lawful — so it is not, by itself, a defect

Do not argue that mixing a local ordinance with a state method is improper. It is actually the correct combination. Section 373.421 makes the statewide wetland definition and the Chapter 62-340 method binding on local governments and preempts them from using their own. So a county that regulates wetlands under Chapter 24 is required to use F.A.C. 62-340 to delineate them. DERM using Chapter 24 for authority and F.A.C. 62-340 for the method is exactly what the law expects. There is also no delegation problem in using F.A.C. 62-340: local governments are supposed to use it, and using it is not an exercise of delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority.

But the admission has two consequences that help you

• It confirms this is a county ordinance action — so the agricultural preemption statutes apply directly. DERM has admitted it is exercising the county's own Chapter 24 power, not delegated state authority. That is exactly the condition that makes Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6) apply: a county may not use any of its powers — any ordinance, including Class IV — to restrict an activity of a bona fide farm operation on Section 193.461 land that is covered by adopted state best management practices, or expressly regulated by the USDA, the Army Corps, or the EPA. Because DERM concedes it is acting under a county ordinance, this preemption is now the main argument, not a minor one.
• It binds DERM to the statewide definition and to proving the method. By admitting it uses F.A.C. 62-340 under Section 373.421, DERM has accepted that it must use the statewide wetland definition (Section 373.019(27)), not any broader local definition of "wetland" in Chapter 24. If the Chapter 24 definition is broader, the state definition controls, and you can challenge any area that meets only the broader local definition. DERM must also actually carry out and prove the F.A.C. 62-340 method — vegetation, soils, hydrologic indicators, sample points, dates, and reasonable scientific judgment — not just show a map or a computer-generated label. Demand the full methodology record and hold DERM to it.

One argument to avoid: do not assume the Environmental Resource Permit exemption automatically applies to Class IV

It is tempting to argue that because DERM used Chapter 373 for the method, the Section 373.406(2) agricultural exemption (also in Chapter 373) must apply to the Class IV permit. Be careful. Section 373.406(2) is an exemption from the state Environmental Resource Permit program, not from a county ordinance. Using the delineation method from Section 373.421 does not automatically make the Section 373.406(2) exemption apply to the local Class IV program. The exemption is still worth raising, but it directly limits the state Environmental Resource Permit; what directly limits the county's Class IV is the agricultural preemption under Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6). Rely primarily on the preemption for the county action, and use the exemption as support.

What to do with the admission

• Get the admission into the record clearly: DERM is proceeding under Chapter 24 (home rule), using F.A.C. 62-340 under Section 373.421, and is not claiming delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority.
• Raise the Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6) preemption, and establish the facts: bona fide farm operation, Section 193.461 classification, and the activity covered by state best management practices or expressly federally regulated.
• Hold DERM to the statewide wetland definition and to full, proven F.A.C. 62-340 compliance; challenge any broader local definition and any conclusion not supported by the field method.
• Still require proof of the exact regulated act, and get advice before signing anything.

Useful term. Delineation method vs. regulatory program. The F.A.C. 62-340 method decides where a wetland is; the Class IV permit is a regulatory program that decides what work needs a permit. A county must use the state method for the first, but its power over the second is still limited by the agricultural preemption statutes.

The strongest defense when DERM uses Chapter 24 and F.A.C. 62-340

When DERM admits it is acting under the county's home-rule Chapter 24 (the Class IV permit) and using the F.A.C. 62-340 method, not every argument in this guide is needed. A focused set of tools fits this exact situation. Here they are, strongest first, for a bona fide farm on agriculturally classified land.

The priority, and a caution. The agricultural preemption is not only the strongest argument — it comes first. It is a preliminary point the hearing officer should decide before reaching the wetland question, so assert it first and assert it firmly. If it succeeds, the county never reaches the wetland question at all. Just as important: do not volunteer, commission, admit, or agree to a F.A.C. 62-340 delineation, and do not apply for the permit. Proving the wetland is the county's burden, not the landowner's — offering a delineation, or agreeing that the delineation is the real question, can concede the very premise the preemption defeats. Everything after the preemption below is a backup argument, used only if the hearing officer wrongly rejects the preemption. Raise it without giving up the preemption, and only by pointing out what the county failed to prove — never by supplying proof for it.

First, and strongest: the agricultural preemption (Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6))

This is the strongest argument in this posture, for four reasons: it is a direct command to the county, it is triggered by DERM's own admission that this is a Chapter 24 action, it is Florida law with no federal-jurisdiction uncertainty, and if it applies it defeats the Class IV permit as applied to the farming. The rule is that a county may not use any of its powers — including a Chapter 24 ordinance — to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified agricultural under Section 193.461, when that activity is covered by adopted state best management practices, or is expressly regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the Environmental Protection Agency.

To make this work, establish and put in the record: (1) the property is classified agricultural under Section 193.461; (2) the operation is a genuine, working farm; (3) the specific activity DERM complains about is ordinary, normal-and-customary farming — not a new conversion of a wetland to a different use; and (4) that activity is covered by adopted state best management practices (for example, enrollment in a state agricultural best-management-practice program), or is expressly regulated by a federal agency. If those facts are established, argue that DERM's Chapter 24 Class IV regulation of that activity is preempted.

Second, and only as a backup: hold DERM to the statewide definition and to proving F.A.C. 62-340

Use this only as a backup, and only if the hearing officer wrongly moves past the preemption — and never by providing a delineation. Proving the wetland is the county's burden, not the landowner's. Because DERM admits it uses F.A.C. 62-340 under Section 373.421, it must use the statewide wetland definition (Section 373.019(27)), and it is preempted from using any broader Chapter 24 local definition. So: require DERM to identify the exact definition it applied; challenge any area that qualifies only under a broader local definition; and require DERM to actually carry out and prove every step of F.A.C. 62-340 — vegetation, soils, hydrologic indicators, sample points, dates, and reasonable scientific judgment. If the area does not meet the statewide definition under a properly performed F.A.C. 62-340, it is not a regulated wetland, even under Chapter 24. A map, a photograph, or a computer-generated label is not the method. Do all of this by pointing out what the county failed to prove — do not supply what is missing by commissioning or offering a delineation.

Third: no deference, and strict proof of the exact act

• No deference (Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 21). Because the defense turns on state statutes and rules (Section 373.421, the preemption statutes, and F.A.C. 62-340), the hearing officer and the reviewing court may not defer to DERM's reading of those state provisions and must interpret them independently. Ask that this standard be stated on the record.
• Prove the exact act. Identifying a wetland is not proving a violation. Require DERM to prove the specific regulated act — what was done, when, where, by whom, and how much — not just that a wetland is present.

Supporting: the agricultural exemption (Section 373.406(2))

Raise this, but understand its role. Section 373.406(2) exempts normal-and-customary agriculture on classified land from the state Environmental Resource Permit — a different program from the county's Class IV. It reinforces that ordinary farming is not what the law targets, and it supports a request for a binding determination from the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Section 373.407). But against the county's Class IV, rely on the preemption above, and use this exemption as support.

Use only if DERM imposes a condition: Koontz

If DERM conditions the permit on a demand — money, mitigation, or restoration — then Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District requires that the demand have an essential connection and rough proportionality to the actual, proven impact of the activity. If DERM has not proven a measurable impact, an open-ended restoration or mitigation demand is vulnerable. Do not raise this unless there is such a condition.

What to set aside in this posture

Keep the case focused. In a Chapter 24 plus F.A.C. 62-340 matter, these tools are usually not the primary argument and can distract from the strongest points:

• The federal cases (Sackett and the Section 404 vacatur) matter only if a federal wetland claim actually appears. DERM's admission points to local and state authority, not federal. Also, Sackett can work against the federal part of the Section 163.3162 preemption, because if the Army Corps has no jurisdiction, the activity is not expressly regulated by the Corps — so rely on the state best-management-practice part of that statute instead.
• Loper Bright, the major-questions doctrine, and Jarkesy are supporting points whose reach to a local hearing is uncertain. Article V, Section 21 already provides the no-deference argument directly.
• Regulatory takings and the executive orders generally belong in separate proceedings with their own timing rules, not in this hearing.

The order of operations

Confirm DERM's admission on the record — Chapter 24 and F.A.C. 62-340, not delegated state authority. Then assert the Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6) preemption first and prove the farm facts, and ask the hearing officer to decide it before reaching the wetland question. Do not volunteer, admit, or provide a F.A.C. 62-340 delineation, and do not apply for the permit. Only as a backup, and without giving up the preemption, hold DERM to the statewide definition and to proving F.A.C. 62-340, and require proof of the exact act — by pointing out the gaps in the county's proof, not by supplying proof for it. Insist on no deference under Article V, Section 21. Raise Koontz only if there is a condition. Still appear and preserve every point in the record — do not simply refuse to participate, or the county may get an uncontested order. Get advice before signing anything.

In one line. Make the agricultural preemption (Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6)) the central position and ask that it be decided first; do not volunteer or admit a F.A.C. 62-340 delineation; and keep DERM's failure of proof as a backup only, used without giving up the preemption.

Part 1 — Understand the situation

Part 2 — Can the agency act? (Authority and reach)

Las Palmas Community / former 8.5 Square Mile Area — start here before DERM's wetland theory

This expands the plain-language overview in The 8.5 Square Mile Area: Public Law 101-229 and the Garcia case above.

1. Public Law 101-229 created the federal water-delivery and flood-protection setting

Public Law 101-229 — the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 — authorized the Modified Water Deliveries project to move more water into Everglades National Park. Congress also required the federal government to address the resulting flood threat to the residential 8.5 Square Mile Area and adjacent agricultural lands. The important point for Maria is simple: Congress itself recognized that federal Everglades operations could change water conditions outside the park and required flood mitigation for the community and agricultural lands.

2. The federal project physically engineered the area's hydrology

The Modified Water Deliveries / 8.5 SMA flood-mitigation system was not merely a paper program. Federal project records describe constructed flood-control and seepage-control features, including levees, canals, pump stations, detention or storage features, and operational water-control plans. The purpose was two-sided: restore more natural hydrologic conditions inside Everglades National Park while reducing or preventing additional flooding in Las Palmas and nearby agricultural areas.

Why that matters. “Natural Everglades hydrology” and “hydrology observed on a Las Palmas parcel” cannot simply be assumed to be the same thing. The government intentionally manages the boundary between the two. That makes causation part of the F.A.C. 62-340 inquiry: what water would be present under the site's relevant natural conditions, and what water is present because of canals, pumps, levees, seepage, operational stages, detention features, or other engineered controls?

3. Garcia v. United States, No. 01-801-CIV-Moore — the litigation history belongs in the factual chain

The Garcia litigation arose from the federal government's attempt to implement an 8.5 SMA plan involving acquisition, condemnation, flood protection, and changed water operations. The district-court ruling was later vacated after the challenged federal plan changed and the appellate dispute became moot, so the vacated ruling should not be presented as binding precedent against DERM. But the litigation is still important historically because it documents that the 8.5 SMA was the subject of an active federal dispute over how much of the community could be acquired, flooded, protected, or subjected to changed water operations.

4. The modern seepage / curtain wall makes the managed-water point even harder to ignore

The government later constructed an underground seepage or curtain wall along the 8.5 Square Mile Area / Las Palmas boundary. South Florida Water Management District materials describe the wall as helping keep water in Everglades National Park while mitigating flooding in the Las Palmas Community and supporting increased flows south for Everglades restoration. In other words, government engineers built a subsurface barrier specifically because water was moving between the park and the community through highly permeable ground.

5. This does not automatically make every Las Palmas parcel legally “non-wetland”

This distinction protects the argument from being overstated. Public Law 101-229, Garcia, the flood-mitigation project, and the seepage wall establish a powerful managed-hydrology factual context. They do not substitute for the parcel-specific statewide wetland methodology. A parcel could still satisfy Florida's wetland criteria after a proper analysis. The point is that DERM must distinguish natural wetland indicators from indicators caused or materially affected by the surrounding engineered water-management system; it cannot simply assume causation from the presence of water or wetland-type vegetation.

6. How this changes the five-gate defense

For Maria in Las Palmas, the five gates are not applied in a factual vacuum. This federal project history becomes the background evidence carried into every gate:

• Gate 1 — farm activity: establish that Maria's parcel is actually being used as bona fide agricultural land inside a community Congress and federal project records separately recognized as residential/agricultural land needing flood protection.
• Gate 2 — state ERP exemption: identify Maria's agricultural purpose before DERM recasts ordinary farm work as wetland destruction.
• Gate 3 — duplicative local regulation: test whether Chapter 24 is being used to regulate an agricultural activity already protected or regulated through the qualifying state/federal agricultural framework.
• Gate 4 — source of authority: force DERM to distinguish its local Chapter 24 power from state ERP authority.
• Gate 5 — F.A.C. 62-340 proof: this is where Public Law 101-229, Garcia's factual history, DBHYDRO, pump records, canal stages, operational plans, flood-mitigation structures, and the seepage wall become direct impeachment and causation evidence against an unsupported assumption of natural hydrology.

7. Maria's F.A.C. 62-340 managed-hydrology questions

• What evidence shows the hydrology at the exact NOV location is natural to that site rather than caused or materially affected by the surrounding federal/state water-management system?
• What dates were the hydrologic observations made, and what were rainfall, canal stages, pump operations, and nearby water levels on those dates?
• Did DERM compare its observations with SFWMD DBHYDRO data?
• Did DERM account for the 8.5 SMA flood-mitigation system and its operating criteria?
• Did DERM account for the underground seepage/curtain wall and the reason it was constructed?
• What evidence separates groundwater or seepage influenced by Everglades restoration operations from the site's claimed natural wetland hydrology?
• Where in DERM's F.A.C. 62-340 file is that causation analysis documented?

In one line. In Las Palmas, first establish the man-managed water system; then make DERM prove the natural wetland conclusion.

The five gates DERM must pass before a wetland NOV can reach a bona fide farm

When Miami-Dade DERM uses Chapter 24 against a bona fide farm on land classified agricultural under Section 193.461, do not mix every argument together. Separate the case into five questions. Each question tests a different source of law. A farmer does not need to pretend Chapter 24 does not exist; instead, require DERM to show that its Chapter 24 action survives every state-law limit that actually applies to the particular farming activity.

The same five questions become a conversation. DERM makes its demand, and Maria walks it through each gate in order — every gate testing a different source of law.

Gate 1 — Is this really a bona fide farm activity on classified agricultural land?

The agricultural protections depend on the facts. Start with the property and the activity, not with the wetland argument. Establish that the land is classified agricultural under Section 193.461, that a genuine agricultural operation is being conducted, and exactly what DERM says the operator did. The question is not merely whether the parcel is called a farm. The question is whether the particular activity charged in the NOV was part of the bona fide farm operation.

Put these facts in the record:

• The current Section 193.461 agricultural classification.
• The crop, livestock, nursery, grove, horticultural, or other agricultural operation actually being conducted.
• The specific activity DERM complains about — for example mowing, cultivating, planting, irrigation, grading, soil preparation, clearing, or placement of material.
• The agricultural purpose of that activity and when and where it occurred.
• Any agricultural best-management-practice enrollment, implementation records, leases, sales records, photographs, invoices, or other evidence showing an actual farm operation.

Gate 2 — Would the state Environmental Resource Permit program require a permit for this activity?

Section 373.406(2) is the state Environmental Resource Permit agricultural exemption. It protects qualifying normal-and-customary agricultural alterations on Section 193.461 land, including alterations that may affect surface-water flow or wetlands, so long as the sole or predominant purpose of the activity is not to impede or divert surface water or adversely affect wetlands. The critical factual question is therefore the purpose of the work: ordinary agricultural production, or work whose predominant purpose is drainage, diversion, filling, or wetland destruction.

Gate 3 — May Miami-Dade separately regulate that same farming activity?

This is where Section 163.3162, the Agricultural Lands and Practices Act, and Section 823.14(6), the Right to Farm Act, become central. These statutes can limit local regulation of an activity of a bona fide farm operation on Section 193.461 land when that activity is already covered by qualifying state best management practices, interim measures, or rules, or — under Section 163.3162 — is expressly regulated by specified federal agencies.

The argument must be tied to the specific activity. Do not say merely, “This is agricultural land, so Chapter 24 does not apply.” Instead ask: “What exact farm activity is DERM regulating, what state or federal agricultural program already regulates that activity, and why is the county imposing a second restriction on the same activity?”

Gate 4 — What authority is DERM actually exercising?

A Chapter 24 Class IV NOV and a state Environmental Resource Permit are not the same regulatory program. Miami-Dade does not need a state Environmental Resource Permit delegation merely to enforce an otherwise valid local Chapter 24 wetland ordinance. But DERM cannot convert Chapter 24 into delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority simply by citing Chapter 373 or a state rule.

The hearing record should therefore separate regulatory authority from wetland methodology:

• Local Chapter 24 authority. If DERM says the NOV is a local Class IV enforcement action under Chapter 24, the absence of Environmental Resource Permit delegation does not by itself defeat the NOV.
• Claimed state Environmental Resource Permit authority. If DERM says it is administering or enforcing the state Environmental Resource Permit program under Chapter 373 or Rule 62-330, require the exact statutory authority and the applicable delegation instrument under Section 373.441 and Chapter 62-344.
• F.A.C. 62-340 methodology. DERM may be required to use F.A.C. 62-340 under Section 373.421 even though it is acting under local Chapter 24 authority. Using the state wetland methodology is not the same thing as possessing delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority.

Useful term. Home rule vs. delegated authority. Home-rule authority is Miami-Dade's own authority to enact and enforce a local ordinance such as Chapter 24. Delegated authority is state power formally transferred to a local government to administer a state program. F.A.C. 62-340 can bind a local government as a methodology without transferring the state Environmental Resource Permit program to that local government.

Gate 5 — If DERM still claims a wetland violation, where is the F.A.C. 62-340 proof?

This is the final technical and evidentiary gate. Section 373.421 establishes the statewide wetland definition and delineation methodology and makes that methodology binding on local governments. Miami-Dade therefore cannot establish the wetland jurisdictional fact merely by using a broader local definition or a different local delineation method.

F.A.C. 62-340 is not Maria's agricultural exemption. It is DERM's final technical proof requirement. Even if DERM survives the earlier agricultural arguments and establishes that Chapter 24 may reach the activity, DERM still has to prove that the particular area involved in the NOV actually meets Florida's controlling wetland definition and delineation methodology.

Require DERM to identify and document:

• The exact statewide wetland definition it applied.
• The F.A.C. 62-340 provision or provisions used to delineate the area.
• The field dates and the persons who performed the work.
• The location of each observation or sampling point.
• The vegetation observations and how they were evaluated.
• The soils observations and how they were evaluated.
• The hydrologic indicators, rainfall or water-level information, and how unusual or managed water conditions were evaluated.
• The reasoning that connects those observations to the wetland boundary shown on DERM's map.
• The exact location of the alleged regulated act in relation to that proven boundary.

A county wetland map may be evidence, but it is not automatically the complete F.A.C. 62-340 analysis. An aerial photograph may be evidence, but it is not automatically the methodology. The word “wetland” in an NOV is an allegation, not proof of every component required by the statewide method.

How the evidence fits the five gates

Independent agency records can support or contradict particular parts of DERM's case, but use each document for what it actually proves. Do not treat a map, agency letter, database, or unrelated permit decision as a substitute for the controlling legal test.

• Property Appraiser records support the Section 193.461 classification.
• FDACS records and agricultural best-management-practice documents can support the bona fide operation, the nature of the farm activity, and the duplicative-regulation arguments.
• South Florida Water Management District records can show how the state Environmental Resource Permit agency treated the same or similar alleged activity and can supply water-management or hydrologic information. A closure letter should be described according to what it actually says; do not automatically turn a closed state case into a ruling that Miami-Dade lacks Chapter 24 authority.
• USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service soil information can provide independent soil and agricultural information, but the precise legal effect depends on the particular document.
• National Wetlands Inventory mapping can corroborate or contradict mapped wetland conditions, but it is not itself the exclusive F.A.C. 62-340 field delineation.
• U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) wetland maps — National Wetlands Inventory (NWI) are independent federal wetland-mapping evidence. If the USFWS/NWI map does not identify the charged area as mapped wetland, that fact can be used to challenge the reliability, consistency, or factual foundation of DERM's wetland position. If the map does identify a wetland, require DERM to show exactly what the federal map classification means, when the source imagery or data were created, how accurately the mapped polygon corresponds to the exact charged area, and why DERM's position still satisfies the separate site-specific requirements of F.A.C. 62-340. A federal wetland map is evidence; it is not permission for DERM to skip the vegetation, soils, hydrology, boundary, and site-specific proof required for its own case.
• FEMA and DBHYDRO records may help test hydrology, rainfall, water levels, and whether observed water conditions were natural, unusual, or managed.
• FDEP delegation records matter if DERM claims it is exercising the state Environmental Resource Permit program. They are not necessary merely because DERM uses F.A.C. 62-340 while enforcing Chapter 24.

What Maria should not concede

• Do not concede that agricultural classification alone decides the case; prove the protected activity and the regulatory coverage that triggers the statutes.
• Do not concede that Chapter 24 automatically becomes state Environmental Resource Permit authority because DERM cites Chapter 373.
• Do not concede that a county map, aerial photograph, database label, or prior local designation automatically satisfies F.A.C. 62-340.
• Do not confuse the Section 373.406(2) state permit exemption with the separate question whether Chapter 24 may regulate the same activity.
• Do not supply missing elements of DERM's wetland proof. If DERM carries the burden of proving the charged wetland violation, point out what its record does not establish.

In one line. Farm first; state permit exemption second; duplicative-local-regulation limits third; source of authority fourth; statewide wetland proof fifth.

Agricultural exemptions and how to use them

This section is for agricultural landowners and operators — for example, farmers, growers, nurseries, and ranchers in the Las Palmas Community (the area formerly known as the 8.5 Square Mile Area). It explains the exemptions that may apply, and, just as important, the limits of those exemptions.

First, an important distinction

People often ask whether there is an "exemption from F.A.C. 62-340." It helps to separate two different things:

• F.A.C. 62-340 is a measurement method. It is the state's procedure for deciding whether an area is a wetland and where the wetland line is. It does not, by itself, prohibit anything. So there is no "exemption" that makes a wetland stop being a wetland simply because the land is farmed or is classified as agricultural. If the point is that the area is not actually a wetland, that is a delineation challenge under the method (see Chapters 4, 5, and 13), not an exemption.
• The exemptions are from the permit requirement. The real agricultural exemptions in Florida law exempt certain activities from needing a permit. They do not change whether the area is a wetland; they only mean that a permit is not required for that activity. This is the key idea: an activity can be exempt from a permit even on land that contains a wetland.

The main state exemption: normal and customary agriculture (Section 373.406(2))

Florida Statutes Section 373.406(2) protects the right of a person engaged in agriculture, silviculture (forestry), floriculture, or horticulture to alter the topography of land — including work that may affect the flow of surface water or affect wetlands — when the work is for purposes consistent with the normal and customary practice of that occupation in the area. By its terms, the exemption applies to land classified as agricultural under Section 193.461.

The limit that matters most: the exemption does not apply if the work is for the sole or predominant purpose of blocking or diverting surface water, or of harming wetlands. In other words, ordinary farming is protected; draining or filling a wetland to convert it to a new use is not.

This is an exemption from the state Environmental Resource Permit program — the state permit for activities affecting wetlands and surface waters, administered by FDEP or the water management district.

How to get an exemption confirmed in writing

• FDACS determination (Section 373.407). The operator can ask the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) for a binding determination of whether the activity qualifies for the Section 373.406(2) exemption. FDACS applies a short test: (1) whether the operator is engaged in agriculture, silviculture, floriculture, or horticulture; and (2) whether the work is consistent with the normal and customary practice of that occupation in the area. A favorable determination is strong evidence to put in the record.
• Formal wetland-line determination (Section 373.421(2)). Separately, the operator can petition FDEP or the water management district for a binding formal determination of where the wetland and surface-water boundary is on the property. Such a determination is generally binding for up to five years, as long as physical conditions do not change. This is a way to establish the boundary before a dispute, rather than argue about it later.

Agricultural classification (Section 193.461): helpful, but not an automatic exemption

Agricultural classification under Section 193.461 is primarily a property-tax status. It matters here because Section 373.406(2) refers to it, and because it is good evidence that the land is in genuine agricultural use. But classification by itself does not automatically exempt any particular activity. The activity still has to be normal and customary agriculture, and still cannot be predominantly to drain or harm a wetland. Do not assume that "the land is classified agricultural" resolves the question.

The federal exemption (Clean Water Act Section 404(f))

Federal law has its own exemption. Under Clean Water Act Section 404(f), established and ongoing normal farming, ranching, and silviculture activities are generally exempt from the federal dredge-and-fill permit. But there is a "recapture" rule: if the work is part of bringing a water or wetland into a new use, and it would impair the flow or reach of the water, a federal permit can still be required. This exemption is federal (the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) and is separate from the state and county programs.

The local complication: county Class IV is a separate program

Miami-Dade's Class IV permit (County Code Chapter 24) is a local program, and the county lists activities such as clearing, farming, and filling in wetlands as examples of work that can require a Class IV permit. A state Environmental Resource Permit exemption under Section 373.406(2) does not automatically cancel the county's separate local authority. In practice this means a landowner may have a strong exemption argument under the state Environmental Resource Permit program and still face a county Class IV claim. The county still has to prove its own authority and its own case — but do not assume the state exemption, by itself, disposes of the county charge. Require the county to address the agricultural exemption and to explain why it believes the exemption does not apply.

What the exemptions do not do

• They do not change whether an area is a wetland. They excuse an activity from a permit; they do not change the delineation.
• They are activity-based and fact-specific. "Normal and customary" and "established, ongoing" are the key phrases. New clearing, imported fill, new drainage, or converting a wetland to a new use is usually not covered by them.
• A state exemption does not automatically bind a county program, and a county program does not control federal jurisdiction. Check all three programs that may apply: state Environmental Resource Permit, county Class IV, and federal Section 404.
• Applying for an after-the-fact permit can be treated as accepting that a permit was required, which contradicts an exemption or jurisdiction defense. Get advice before signing any permit application, consent order, or restoration agreement.

Useful term. Exemption vs. delineation. An exemption excuses an activity from needing a permit. A delineation decides whether and where a wetland exists. Winning one does not automatically win the other, so it is important to be clear about which argument is being made.

Part 3 — Can the agency prove it? (Method, evidence, hearing basics)

Part 4 — The case, step by step

How to get the agency's records (public records requests)

Throughout this guide, Maria asks the agency for maps, field data, photographs, and the methodology behind the wetland finding. This section explains how to actually obtain those records — before the hearing, so the landowner has time to prepare. This is the concrete step behind Chapter 10 (Before the hearing).

A landowner has a legal right to these records

In Florida, government records are open to the public under the Public Records Act (Chapter 119, Florida Statutes) and the Florida Constitution. Miami-Dade County and DERM are covered by this law. In practice that means:

• Anyone can ask. A requester does not have to be a lawyer, a Florida resident, or even the property owner.
• A requester does not have to give a reason for wanting the records.
• There is no special form that must be used, and the county cannot require a requester to explain the reason or show identification.
• A request can be spoken or written, but putting it in writing provides a dated copy of what was asked for and when.

FOIA is a different law, and it usually does not apply here

FOIA — the federal Freedom of Information Act — applies only to federal agencies. It does not cover Miami-Dade County, DERM, or Florida state agencies such as FDEP or the water management district. For county and state records, a Florida public records request is used, not FOIA. FOIA is used only if a federal agency has the needed records — for example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers if there is a federal Clean Water Act question about the same property. Federal FOIA requests can be filed through FOIA.gov.

Where to send a Miami-Dade / DERM request

A public records request is a separate legal channel from the hearing. It goes to the county's records custodian and its online records system — not to the Code Enforcement hearing office — so it does not depend on anyone at the hearing office answering a phone. DERM is part of the county's Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources (RER), and there are a few options, none of which require a phone call:

• Search first. Many inspection, permit, and enforcement records for a property are already available in RER's online environmental records system, so some documents may be available immediately.
• Submit a request online. Use the county's public records request system (the GovQA portal), which lets a requester submit a request and track its status.
• Or send it in writing. A requester can email or mail a written request to the RER public records custodian. Confirm the current custodian and address on the county records page, since contacts change.

Because these methods are online or in writing, they create a dated, trackable record of the request even when the hearing office cannot be reached. A requester may also go in person to inspect records at the RER records office. Obtaining the county's file does not require the hearing-office phone line at all.

Ask early, and be specific

Send the request as soon as the notice is received. Hearing and appeal deadlines are short, and the records are needed well before the hearing so they can be reviewed. Identify the property by its folio number and the case by its case number, and ask for the complete file plus the specific items below.

What to request in a DERM wetland case (adapt to the specific facts):

• The complete enforcement and case file for the case number and folio.
• The inspector's field notes and inspection report(s).
• The completed Chapter 62-340 data form (FDEP Form 62-330.201(1)), or whatever field form was actually used.
• The wetland delineation and the mapped boundary, with the GPS coordinates or sample-point locations.
• The vegetation data, soil observations, and the specific hydrologic indicators recorded, each with dates.
• Any wetland-hydrology analysis, and the rainfall or water-management data the agency relied on.
• All photographs and videos — the original files, with their metadata (dates and GPS), not only printed copies.
• The mapping data layers and map source data used to call the area a wetland.
• Internal emails and communications about the property or the case.
• The documents showing the agency's authority: the exact code provisions, and any state-to-county delegation instrument if state Environmental Resource Permit authority is claimed.
• The name and qualifications of the person who actually made the wetland determination.
• The service and posting records showing how and when the notice was delivered.

How to phrase the request

Keep it short and clear. A simple written request can say:

Costs

The county can charge for copies — under Florida law, up to 15 cents for a one-sided page — and, for large requests that take significant staff time, a reasonable labor charge based on the cost of the staff time involved. Ask for a cost estimate first, and ask for electronic copies to reduce the cost.

If the county does not respond, or provides no way to communicate

The records custodian is required by law to respond within a reasonable time and to state a specific legal exemption for anything withheld or redacted. This obligation stands even if the hearing office cannot be reached — the records request and the hearing are separate. Send the request in writing (through the online portal, by email, and if needed by certified mail) so there is a dated, trackable record of exactly what was asked for and when, even if it is ignored.

If the county still does not respond, a failure to produce non-exempt public records is itself a violation of the Public Records Act, and it can be enforced in circuit court. Under Section 119.12, a requester who gives the custodian at least five business days' written notice before filing suit, and then prevails in an action to compel production, may recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs; a petition for mandamus can also be used to compel a response. The pre-suit notice alone often prompts the records to appear.

If records still cannot be obtained in time, the documented effort becomes evidence in its own right, and it can be used three ways. First, mention the failure in the opening statement, to frame the case as one where the county demanded a defense while disclosing nothing and giving no way to obtain its evidence — though an opening statement is not itself evidence. Second, and most important, offer the request and the proof of non-response as a marked, numbered exhibit and move it into the record; if the hearing officer refuses to admit it, make a proffer so it stays with the record. Third, make a specific objection that the county's failure to disclose its evidence and provide access denied due process, and ask for a ruling — a continuance, exclusion of the county's undisclosed evidence, or dismissal; if the officer will not rule, note the refusal. Because certiorari reviews only the record made below, this exhibit, objection, and ruling are what let the circuit court see the due-process defect, so they should be cited directly in the certiorari petition. A ready-to-use opening statement and a written Exhibit 1 that carry this out are linked in Chapter 11.

Finally, the county's evidence does not stay hidden. To prove the violation, the county must present its own evidence at the hearing, so it will appear there. When it does, object that it was never disclosed in advance — leaving no real chance to prepare or rebut — and request a continuance to review it. If the continuance is denied, that denial is preserved as a due-process error for circuit court review.

Useful term. Public records request: a request under Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, to inspect or copy government records. In Florida a requester does not have to give a reason or be a resident, and the agency must produce non-exempt records or cite a specific legal exemption for anything it withholds.

Part 5 — Looking closely at the evidence

Part 6 — The decision and how to challenge it

After a loss — the no-surrender continuity system

What it means. Losing the administrative hearing does not mean surrendering the property, the record, or every later legal right. It means the case changes posture. From this point forward, Maria stops repeating arguments merely because she disagrees with the hearing officer and instead asks a disciplined question: what lawful door is open now? The system below continues for as long as there is a real review right, a genuine jurisdictional or due-process defect, a new enforcement event, a defective lien or collection step, a new agency act, or an independent claim supported by facts and law.

The continuity map: never surrender a live right, never invent one

Step 1 — Seize the four records

Maria creates four separate folders and does not rely on anyone's memory:

• Administrative hearing record: NOV/citation, hearing notice, service, transcript or recording, exhibit list, admitted and rejected exhibits, motions, objections, rulings, final order, and proof of rendition.
• DERM technical file: inspections, original photographs and available metadata, GPS points, maps, field sheets, vegetation observations, soils, hydrologic indicators, sample locations, boundary work, drafts, supervisory review, and the complete F.A.C. 62-340 material actually relied upon.
• Court record: if anything was filed, obtain the case number, docket, petition, appendix, filing timestamp, fees, service, responses, orders, and mandate.
• Attorney file: engagement agreement, correspondence, research, drafts, calendaring, filing receipts, rejection notices, and the materials Maria supplied.

Step 2 — If the direct-review clock is open, use it first

A petition for writ of certiorari challenging the local administrative final order is time-sensitive. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100 generally requires a certiorari petition to be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order being reviewed. The exact triggering order and any authorized tolling event must be verified from the governing rule and case posture. Do not assume that an informal request for reconsideration extends the deadline.

Step 3 — If first-tier certiorari is lost, test second-tier certiorari

A circuit court's first-tier certiorari decision may itself be subject to second-tier certiorari in the Third District Court of Appeal. The second tier is deliberately narrow. Maria does not ask the Third DCA simply to reweigh DERM's evidence or decide the wetland facts again. She asks whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law, and whether any departure from the essential requirements of law caused the kind of miscarriage of justice that second-tier certiorari is designed to correct.

Step 4 — When ordinary review is gone, perform a true voidness audit

Finality matters. Once ordinary review expires, Maria cannot convert every preserved F.A.C. 62-340 or agricultural-preemption error into “voidness.” She makes a separate validity chart:

• Subject-matter jurisdiction: Did the tribunal have legal power over this category of proceeding?
• Notice and service: Was Maria given the legally required notice of the charge and proceeding?
• Opportunity to be heard: Was she actually given a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and argument on the matter decided?
• Order beyond the case presented: Did the tribunal purport to adjudicate a matter or party that was never legally before it? This must be analyzed under the specific governing law; not every excess of authority is jurisdictional.

Do not use “no ERP delegation” as the voidness theory where DERM expressly proceeded under Chapter 24. As explained earlier in this guide, Miami-Dade does not need State ERP delegation merely to administer its separate local Class IV program. The delegation issue becomes relevant if DERM actually claims to exercise delegated State ERP authority.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) permits relief from a civil-court judgment or order that is void, and Florida appellate decisions recognize that a true voidness claim is not governed by the one-year limitation that applies to several other Rule 1.540 grounds. But Rule 1.540 should not be described as though it automatically vacates a county administrative order. The correct procedural vehicle depends on what court judgment or enforcement proceeding actually exists.

Step 5 — Turn every later enforcement act into a fresh legality check

A final administrative order and a later enforcement measure are different events. Recording a lien is not itself a new civil lawsuit, but foreclosure or another judicial collection action is. Maria tests each later act for defects that belong to that act:

• Was a lien authorized by the governing ordinance/statute and properly recorded?
• Does the amount mathematically match the order and lawful accrual period?
• Is the correct owner and parcel identified?
• Were conditions precedent to enforcement satisfied?
• Has the lien been satisfied, reduced, released, expired, or otherwise become unenforceable?
• If a foreclosure complaint is filed, was process properly served and are all available defenses and counterclaims timely pleaded?
• Does constitutional homestead protection apply? The answer depends on the precise lien and statutory authority; do not assume either result.

Step 6 — Keep independent claims independent

A separate claim can continue the legal fight only if it is genuinely separate. A takings claim, Bert J. Harris Act claim, civil-rights claim, or legal-malpractice claim has its own elements and its own clock. Federal court is not a replacement appellate court for an unfavorable local or state judgment, and claim/issue preclusion can limit attempts to re-litigate matters already finally decided.

• Takings: evaluate what government action allegedly took property, when the claim became ripe/accrued, what property interest was affected, and what remedy is sought. Knick removed the old requirement that a property owner first pursue a state compensation action before bringing a ripe federal takings claim, but it did not erase ordinary jurisdictional or preclusion doctrines.
• Bert J. Harris Act: separately analyze whether a specific governmental action inordinately burdened an existing use or vested right, and strictly calendar the statute's notice and claim requirements.
• Section 1983: do not name an inspector personally merely because Maria disagrees with the NOV. There must be an actual constitutional violation, a proper defendant and theory of liability, and immunity defenses must be confronted.
• Attorney malpractice: if counsel missed a jurisdictional deadline, preserve the complete file and separately evaluate professional-negligence remedies. Attorney error does not automatically reopen the governmental case.

Step 7 — New NOV, new condition, new restoration demand: start the five gates again

The County may take a later action after the first order. Maria does not automatically accept the new action as a consequence of the old one. For every new NOV, inspection, permit condition, restoration specification, or enforcement demand she starts again:

1. What exact act is DERM regulating now?
2. What exact legal authority supports this new act?
3. Do the agricultural protections apply to this activity?
4. Is DERM claiming local Chapter 24 power or State ERP power?
5. If wetland status is material, what F.A.C. 62-340 evidence establishes the particular area involved?
6. What part of the old final order, if any, actually decides this new issue?

This is how persistence becomes lawful continuity rather than repetitive litigation: new governmental action receives a new, fact-specific legality analysis.

Step 8 — Bankruptcy can become a separate federal track, with an adversary proceeding when the rules require one

Bankruptcy should not be saved in the manual as though it becomes relevant only after every other remedy is exhausted. It can become relevant at different points in the dispute if Maria independently qualifies for bankruptcy relief and the filing serves a legitimate bankruptcy purpose. The timing changes what bankruptcy can and cannot do.

When bankruptcy may enter the timeline

• After the NOV but before the administrative hearing. Bankruptcy may protect the estate from many creditor collection acts, but Maria should not assume it stops the DERM hearing. The police-and-regulatory exception can allow the County to continue determining whether a violation exists and to enter regulatory relief.
• After the administrative final order. Bankruptcy does not become a substitute certiorari appeal. The final order and any preserved review rights still have their own deadlines. Bankruptcy instead affects claims, property of the estate, collection, liens, priority, dischargeability, and bankruptcy-specific remedies.
• After a County lien is recorded. This is where bankruptcy can become especially important. Maria and counsel can determine how the County has characterized its claim, whether it is secured, what property the lien reaches, its amount and priority, whether an avoidance mechanism applies, and whether a dispute over the validity, priority, or extent of the lien must be brought as an adversary proceeding.
• After foreclosure or active collection begins. Filing may stay many collection acts, subject to the Bankruptcy Code's exceptions and any later order granting relief from stay. Maria should immediately determine what part of the County's action is regulatory and what part is enforcement of a pecuniary claim.
• During a reorganization case. In a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 case where available, the treatment of allowed claims and liens may become part of the plan process. The plan, claim-objection process, lien litigation, and adversary proceedings are distinct tools and must not be treated as interchangeable.

What an adversary proceeding actually is

An adversary proceeding is a lawsuit inside the bankruptcy case. Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure governs it. Rule 7001 identifies matters that require an adversary complaint rather than an ordinary motion. Among the most relevant to a County enforcement dispute are proceedings to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property, subject to listed exceptions, and proceedings governed by the dischargeability rules. The adversary case has its own complaint, summons, service, pleadings, discovery, evidence, and judgment.

Maria's bankruptcy/adversary checklist

1. Identify the bankruptcy chapter and legitimate bankruptcy purpose. Bankruptcy is a comprehensive financial proceeding with disclosure duties, trustee/court oversight, eligibility rules, exemptions, and consequences for all creditors—not a single-purpose procedural weapon against DERM.
2. Schedule the County claim accurately. List the NOV-related debt, lien, judgment, fine, restoration claim, or disputed claim as required, marking disputes accurately rather than omitting the County.
3. Separate regulatory power from money collection. Ask what DERM is doing today: determining compliance, ordering remediation, fixing a penalty, collecting money, foreclosing a lien, or taking estate property. Section 362 treats those categories differently.
4. Audit every County proof of claim. Compare the proof of claim with the final order, lien, accrual calculations, parcel, owner, payment history, and governing ordinance. A claim objection and an adversary proceeding are different procedures; use the one the Bankruptcy Rules require.
5. Identify whether Rule 7001 requires a complaint. If Maria seeks a determination of the validity, priority, or extent of a lien/property interest, or another form of relief covered by Rule 7001, use an adversary proceeding unless a stated exception applies.
6. Test dischargeability separately. Governmental fines and penalties can be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), particularly when payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit and not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. Do not promise that bankruptcy erases an environmental/code penalty.
7. Preserve the automatic-stay record. Save the petition date/time, notice to the County, all post-petition letters, lien activity, foreclosure filings, payment demands, and property actions. If a stay dispute exists, the precise governmental act and timing matter.
8. Do not use bankruptcy to miss a live certiorari deadline. Unless controlling law actually stays or tolls that deadline, Maria preserves direct review separately.

Useful term. Adversary proceeding. A separate civil lawsuit inside an existing bankruptcy case, commenced by complaint and governed principally by Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It is used for specified disputes identified by Rule 7001; it is not automatically available to retry every issue decided before bankruptcy.

Primary bankruptcy authorities to verify in the current case: 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay and governmental police/regulatory exception); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (certain governmental fines and penalties); Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Part VII, especially Rule 7001 (types of adversary proceedings) and Rule 4007 (dischargeability procedure). Bankruptcy rules and local bankruptcy-court procedures can change, so verify the current rules before filing.

Step 9 — Ask for a stay when the law provides one; never assume one

When Maria has a live review proceeding or another proceeding capable of supporting a stay, she evaluates a motion to stay enforcement. The tribunal may require a bond or impose conditions. A public-records request, complaint to another agency, or unrelated lawsuit does not automatically stay the final order.

Step 10 — Compliance under protest is not surrender

Maria does not create a contempt or additional violation simply to prove resistance. Where an order remains enforceable and no stay exists, she distinguishes complying with an enforceable command from conceding DERM's legal theory. Written reservations of rights, objections, and careful documentation can preserve the fact that compliance was compelled rather than voluntary, subject to advice about the particular order.

Step 11 — The anti-sanctions rule: persistence must be evidence-driven

A strategy designed merely to impose cost, delay, or burden on the opposing party can lead to sanctions and can damage the strongest legitimate arguments. Maria's system therefore has a mandatory filter before every filing:

• What live legal right does this filing invoke?
• What record evidence supports each factual statement?
• What authority supports the requested remedy?
• Is this issue already finally decided, and if so, what doctrine permits it to be raised now?
• What deadline applies?
• What result can the tribunal legally grant?

If those questions cannot be answered, Maria does not file the paper. She preserves the evidence instead and waits for a legally meaningful event.

Maria's post-loss example from beginning to end

The through-line

• Before finality: attack legal and factual error through timely review.
• After ordinary review expires: reserve “void” for genuine jurisdictional or due-process invalidity.
• At enforcement: test the new enforcement act for its own defects and raise any legitimately preserved validity defense.
• For new DERM action: restart the five-gate analysis.
• For independent claims: satisfy their own elements; never use them as disguised appeals.
• Always: preserve the record, calendar the deadline, request a stay where authorized, avoid admissions and waivers, and keep every filing grounded in law and evidence.

In one line. No surrender means no abandonment of a live right — not endless repetition. Maria keeps the matter alive by identifying each new lawful procedural door as it opens, preserving the record needed to use it, and refusing to turn a strong case into sanctionable noise.

Part 7 — Seeing the whole case clearly

Teaching module — defending from the four corners of DERM’s posted cease-and-desist notice

How a farmer can use the County’s own charging document to test jurisdiction, notice, proof, causation, remedy, and due process before the County adds explanations later.

Exhibit 1 — the posted Field Notice of Violation and Orders to Cease and Desist

The posted Field Notice, reproduced exactly as issued (Folio 30-5815-000-0795, DERM Case CLIV-20240048). Preserve the original exactly as found — see “Preserve the original notice as physical evidence,” below.

Learning objective

Use the notice itself as a controlled teaching exhibit. Separate conclusions from evidence, force every undefined term into the open, preserve every omission in the administrative record, and avoid overstating defects that merely require the County to prove additional facts at the hearing.

A. The foundational principle: a government conclusion is not the underlying proof

The notice appears to accuse the operator of “clearing a wetland without a Class IV Permit and filling.” That sentence contains several conclusions — wetland, clearing, filling, permit requirement, responsibility — but the face of the notice does not itself supply all of the evidence needed to establish those conclusions. The farmer’s task is to require DERM to prove each proposition separately in the administrative record.

B. Forty defects and teaching points visible from the notice itself

The points below do not all produce automatic dismissal. Some are notice defects, some are missing proof, some are foundation issues, some concern the remedy, and some become important only if DERM relies on additional evidence later. The teaching objective is to know what each omission allows the farmer to demand and preserve.

1. The notice does not prove that the property is a wetland

The notice states that unauthorized work occurred in, on, or upon wetlands, but it contains no wetland delineation, boundary, field-data form, vegetation analysis, hydric-soil findings, hydrology findings, sample points, GPS coordinates, transects, acreage determination, or methodology explanation. The word “wetland” is therefore a conclusion on the face of the notice, not the underlying scientific record.

2. No F.A.C. Chapter 62-340 methodology appears on the notice

Nothing on the face of the notice identifies that Chapter 62-340 was applied, who applied it, which rule provisions were used, what vegetation was identified, what soils were examined, what hydrologic indicators existed, where observations were made, or what boundary resulted.

3. No location of the alleged wetland is identified

A folio number identifies the parcel, not the alleged wetland boundary within the parcel. The notice contains no coordinates, dimensions, survey points, marked aerial, acreage, compass directions, distances from boundaries, or mapped violation area.

4. The alleged “clearing” is undefined

The notice does not state what vegetation was removed, the species involved, acreage, equipment, date, whether the inspector observed the act, whether mowing or harvesting was involved, or whether routine agricultural maintenance was being characterized as clearing.

5. The alleged “filling” is undefined

The notice does not identify the material, source, composition, quantity, depth, location, date, or person who placed it. It does not distinguish soil, rock, gravel, organic mulch, compost, chipped vegetation, agricultural residue, or native material.

6. The notice does not identify who performed the alleged activity

The owner/operator line identifies a person associated with the property, but the notice does not state that the named person cleared, filled, directed, hired, authorized, or knowingly caused the alleged conduct. The contractor/facility line appears blank.

7. No date of the alleged clearing or filling is stated

An inspection date is not necessarily the date the alleged act occurred. The notice says the representative inspected and documented a condition; it does not state that the inspector personally observed the clearing or filling taking place on that date.

8. The notice does not distinguish an existing condition from an observed violation

DERM may have observed cleared ground, mulch, vegetation, rows, or material. Observation of a condition does not automatically establish who created it, when it was created, whether a permit was required at that time, or whether it was agricultural or preexisting.

9. No agricultural-use analysis appears on the notice

The notice does not identify agricultural classification, crop production, agricultural history, Section 193.461, Section 373.406, normal farming practices, or any analysis of agricultural protection before enforcement was ordered.

10. The notice does not explain why a Class IV permit was legally required

The document jumps from the alleged clearing/filling to an after-the-fact Class IV permit demand without explaining the permit trigger, exceptions considered, agricultural treatment, or legal reasoning connecting the facts to the permit requirement.

11. The corrective demand presupposes the disputed wetland premise

The notice appears to give two paths: submit an after-the-fact Class IV application, or return the property to wetland grade/elevation and remove alleged fill. Both assume the wetland and violation conclusions are correct before the farmer has had a hearing.

12. “Return the property to wetland grade and elevation” is vague

The notice does not state a target elevation, vertical datum, benchmark, survey, prior grade, restoration limits, cross-section, or engineering specification.

13. “Remove the fill material” is undefined

The notice does not identify which material must be removed, from where, in what quantity, or to what depth. If DERM considers organic agricultural mulch or native material to be fill, that characterization is not explained on the face of the notice.

14. No preexisting baseline condition is identified

A restoration command logically assumes a prior condition, yet the notice does not identify the prior grade, elevation, vegetation, soil condition, hydrology, or baseline wetland condition.

15. No quantified environmental harm is identified

The notice does not describe loss of wetland function, altered hydrology, blocked flow, habitat effect, water-quality effect, acreage impacted, or measurable ecological injury.

16. The notice does not separate the factual elements of each alleged violation

“Clearing a wetland without a Class IV Permit and filling” compresses potentially distinct theories into one handwritten statement. The notice does not state whether clearing, filling, unpermitted work, and permit failure are separate charges or one theory.

17. A code citation does not substitute for factual particularity

The notice references Section 24-48(1), but citing a law is different from explaining the facts that satisfy each legal element.

18. No evidence file is attached to the posted notice

The notice does not attach photographs, field notes, inspection reports, GIS layers, soils information, hydrology records, vegetation data, wetland forms, maps, or witness materials.

19. The appeal-rights area appears physically obscured

On the preserved image, a business card covers a substantial portion of the printed lower section that appears to contain information concerning further enforcement and review. If the notice was posted in this configuration, the physical condition of the notice may itself be important due-process evidence.

20. A 48-hour contact demand appears more prominent than review rights

The notice visibly directs contact with DERM within 48 hours and corrective action within 30 days, while the lower printed review language appears partly obscured in the preserved image.

21. Personal service is not apparent from the notice

The form appears to indicate posting, while the recipient-name/signature fields do not clearly identify a recipient. That creates a factual question about when the farmer actually received notice and what service method DERM used.

22. The identity of the recipient is unclear

The lower-left received-by area contains markings, but the recipient name and title are not clearly established on the face of the preserved notice.

23. The issuing employee's enforcement authority should be established

The notice identifies an employee and job title, but the notice itself does not explain the employee's authority to issue the cease-and-desist command, whether a Director authorized it, or whether enforcement authority was delegated internally.

24. Technical qualifications are not shown on the notice

A job title does not, by itself, establish education, wetland-delineation training, soils expertise, hydrology expertise, certifications, or Rule 62-340 experience.

25. The notice does not identify who actually made the wetland determination

The person who posted or signed the notice may not be the person who performed the wetland analysis. The face of the notice does not identify whether the conclusion came from the inspector, another biologist, GIS staff, a consultant, a prior map, or another agency.

26. There is an apparent chronology/date issue that requires explanation

The preserved notice contains a handwritten date (8/1/2024) that appears different from the later typed case/date reference in the publication (May 28, 2025). A discrepancy is not automatically invalidity, but chronology matters.

27. The notice indicates the posting was photographed, creating discoverable evidence

The form appears to mark “Photographed: Y.” If DERM photographed the posting, those original photographs may show exactly what was posted, where, when, and what portions of the notice were visible.

28. The notice does not state that DERM actually observed the farmer performing the act

“Inspected and documented unauthorized work” is not the same as “personally observed Respondent clearing or filling.” The wording leaves open whether the inspector saw an act or inferred causation from a condition.

29. No evidence on the face of the notice connects the condition to the farmer

The notice itself provides no witness statement, photograph of the farmer acting, delivery ticket, contractor record, video, admission, or other causal evidence.

30. The cease-and-desist command may be overbroad for an operating farm

The notice orders cessation of unauthorized work/activity but does not clearly distinguish the charged conduct from lawful ongoing planting, watering, feeding, harvesting, mowing, maintenance, irrigation, or equipment movement.

31. The notice does not say whether normal farming may continue

For a working agricultural operation, silence about ordinary farming can create immediate practical uncertainty and economic harm.

32. No emergency factual basis is stated for immediate cessation

The notice does not describe a continuing discharge, imminent environmental injury, danger to health, or other emergency circumstance on its face.

33. The notice provides no visible pre-deprivation fact-finding process

The farmer is ordered to stop, contact DERM, apply for a permit, or restore the property before the notice itself demonstrates how the farmer can contest the wetland and violation premises.

34. The after-the-fact permit demand can prejudice a jurisdictional defense

Applying for an after-the-fact permit may later be characterized as recognizing permit applicability or accepting DERM jurisdiction, depending on the application and circumstances.

35. The notice does not explain whether its two corrective paths are truly alternatives

The handwritten “OR” suggests alternatives, but the notice does not explain whether submission of an application suspends restoration, whether penalties accrue, what happens if the application is denied, or whether an appeal stays either deadline.

36. The notice does not clearly explain what happens if the farmer contests jurisdiction

The visible corrective choices focus on permit or restoration. A separate route for disputing wetland status, agricultural protection, or permit applicability is not clearly stated in the handwritten corrective section.

37. No penalty amount is stated on the face of the notice

The form references enforcement/penalty consequences, but the farmer cannot determine from the face of the notice the amount, accrual method, maximum exposure, or lien consequences.

38. The evidentiary burden and standard are nowhere stated on the notice

The notice does not tell the farmer what DERM must prove, what burden applies at hearing, or what evidence constitutes proof of wetland, clearing, filling, responsibility, and permit applicability.

39. The notice collapses jurisdiction and merits into one conclusion

The notice effectively treats wetland status, activity, responsibility, permit requirement, agricultural defenses, and remedy as a single proposition. They are analytically separate questions.

40. The notice itself can become Respondent's affirmative evidence

The farmer should not treat the notice only as the County's paper. Its omissions, ambiguous language, physical condition, service markings, dates, corrective wording, and photographed-posting notation can be used to test the County's later testimony.

C. What the notice proves — and what it does not prove — on its face

On its face, the notice principally shows that a County employee inspected the parcel, DERM asserted unauthorized clearing/filling in wetlands, cited a County Code provision, directed immediate cessation, required contact within a short period, demanded corrective action within approximately 30 days, and appears to indicate that the posting was photographed.

The notice does not, by itself, establish the full scientific, factual, causation, agricultural, jurisdictional, or remedial predicates behind those conclusions. Those matters must be supplied through competent evidence if they are necessary elements of the County’s case.

D. Cross-examination drill: use the notice as the question sheet

The agricultural landowner or operator can hand the witness the notice and ask short, controlled questions. The objective is not to argue after every answer. The objective is to build a sequence of clear admissions showing what is — and is not — contained in the charging document and what additional proof the County is relying upon.

1. Show me the Rule 62-340 delineation on this notice.
2. Show me the vegetation data on this notice.
3. Show me the soils data on this notice.
4. Show me the hydrology data on this notice.
5. Show me the wetland boundary on this notice.
6. Show me the GPS coordinates of the alleged clearing.
7. Show me the acreage allegedly cleared.
8. Show me the material identified as fill.
9. Show me the quantity and depth of the alleged fill.
10. Show me where this notice states that I personally placed that material.
11. Show me the date the alleged filling occurred.
12. Show me where the notice evaluates agricultural classification.
13. Show me where the notice evaluates an agricultural exemption or protection.
14. Show me the target elevation for the restoration you ordered.
15. Show me the survey datum or benchmark.
16. Show me the evidence of the preexisting elevation.
17. Show me the specific agricultural activity the notice ordered me to stop.
18. Show me the appeal instructions that were visible when the notice was posted.
19. Was this notice posted rather than personally handed to me?
20. Did you personally witness me clearing or filling anything?

E. Model threshold statement for the administrative record

F. Teaching caution — do not overclaim

A missing item on the face of the field notice does not automatically mean DERM can never prove that item later. The farmer should distinguish among:

• A defect in notice or service that may independently affect due process or deadlines.
• A missing evidentiary foundation that DERM may attempt to supply at the hearing.
• A disputed legal issue, such as permit applicability or agricultural protection.
• A remedy defect, such as an undefined restoration elevation.
• A credibility or chronology issue created when later documents differ from the original notice.

The strongest record is accurate: preserve the omission, object when appropriate, require the County to cure or prove the point, state the prejudice caused by late or missing information, and obtain a ruling.

G. Preserve the original notice as physical evidence

Keep the original notice in the same condition in which it was found at the gate. Do not remove cards, tape, staples, annotations, or other physical features before photographing and preserving them. Make color photographs of the front and back, record the date and location where it was discovered, and preserve any surveillance footage or witness who saw the posting. If the appeal language was obscured when posted, the condition of the original document may be more important than a later clean copy produced by the County.

H. Official authority and verification links

• Florida Statutes §373.406 — Exemptions
• Florida Statutes §373.407 — FDACS binding agricultural-exemption determination
• Florida Statutes §373.441 — ERP delegation
• F.A.C. Chapter 62-340 — Wetland and surface-water delineation
• FDEP reference — Chapter 62-340 Data Form, Form 62-330.201(1)
• Miami-Dade Class IV Environmental Permit page
• Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure — Rule 9.100 / Rule 9.190
• Florida Statutes Chapter 119 — Public Records
• Florida Statutes §70.001 — Bert J. Harris Act
• Florida Statutes §70.51 — Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution
• Respondent Hearing Packet — Introduction, Opening Statement & Exhibit 1

I. One-page hearing-to-court checklist

SFWMDSouth Florida Water Management District — a separate state regional agency

Everything inside this box concerns the South Florida Water Management District and its state Environmental Resource Permit program under Part IV of Chapter 373, F.S. It is not Miami-Dade County DERM (a county home-rule program), and not a federal agency. Each agency is answered under its own law.

Companion example — the SFWMD parallel, and Maria’s model response

Enforcement of this kind is rarely one agency acting alone. A county wetlands program and the regional water-management district often work in tandem: when a landowner refuses to concede a wetland classification, the county may bring in the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), whose Investigative Notice adds the threat of ERP permitting, restoration, penalties, and recovery of staff time and attorney’s fees. The lesson of this module applies with equal force to the District: a government notice is not proof, the agency must operate within the law and prove its own authority and jurisdiction, and the landowner concedes nothing. The law binds the government as much as the citizen.

The two District letters below are reproduced exactly as received in one real matter (Enforcement Case No. 23523). The second one matters: after the landowner responded and conceded nothing, the District closed the enforcement case with no action necessary. That is the point of this example — an ERP enforcement action can be met on the law and resolved in the landowner’s favor. What follows the letters is a model response, written in the manner this manual teaches, that a landowner (here, Maria) could adapt.

The District’s Investigative Notice (as received)

The District’s closure of the enforcement case (as received), with the location map and envelope

The authorities: why the District cannot apply ERP to bona fide agricultural land — and how each protection applies to the District specifically

Every agency must be met under its own law. The defenses that answer Miami-Dade DERM are not identical to the defenses that answer the District, because the two agencies draw their power from different sources. DERM is a county home-rule program whose reach depends on the county code (Chapter 24) and on whether the State has delegated Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) authority to it under §373.441, F.S. The District is a regional agency that administers the State’s ERP program directly under Part IV of Chapter 373, F.S. So against the District the question is not “show your delegation” — it is whether an ERP is required at all. For bona fide agricultural land, the statute answers that question directly.

1. The express agricultural exemption — §373.406(2), F.S. This is a direct statutory exemption from the very ERP program the District invokes. In its own words:

“Notwithstanding s. 403.927, nothing herein, or in any rule, regulation, or order adopted pursuant hereto, shall be construed to affect the right of any person engaged in the occupation of agriculture, silviculture, floriculture, or horticulture to alter the topography of any tract of land, including, but not limited to, activities that may impede or divert the flow of surface waters or adversely impact wetlands, for purposes consistent with the normal and customary practice of such occupation in the area. However, such alteration or activity may not be for the sole or predominant purpose of impeding or diverting the flow of surface waters or adversely impacting wetlands. This exemption applies to lands classified as agricultural pursuant to s. 193.461 and to activities requiring an environmental resource permit pursuant to this part.”— §373.406(2), Florida Statutes

Three features make this decisive for a bona fide farm: it expressly covers agricultural topography alteration “including… activities that may… adversely impact wetlands”; it expressly applies to land “classified as agricultural pursuant to s. 193.461” — bona fide agricultural classification; and it expressly applies to “activities requiring an environmental resource permit pursuant to this part” — the District’s own program. The only limits are that the alteration cannot be for the “sole or predominant purpose” of impeding/diverting surface waters or adversely impacting wetlands, and cannot cover activities previously authorized by an ERP. Florida courts have applied this exemption to bar district permitting where the owner is engaged in agriculture and the alteration is consistent with agricultural practice.

Applied to this case — the material called “fill” is agricultural mulch. Where the county and the District allege “filling,” the material at issue is permitted agricultural mulch: organic material used as a normal, customary agricultural practice for soil health, moisture retention, and weed suppression. Mulching is not the placement of regulated fill to raise grade or impound water, and an agency cannot manufacture a wetland-filling violation by relabeling a permitted agricultural material. The agency must identify and prove that the specific material is regulated fill that altered a jurisdictional wetland — not agricultural mulch applied for farming. “Debris” (discarded solid waste) and “contamination” (a pollutant or hazardous discharge regulated under Chapters 376 and 403, F.S.) are separate legal categories with separate proof requirements and separate statutes; organic agricultural mulch used in a bona fide farm operation is none of these, and calling it “debris” or “contamination” does not make it so. Mulching as a normal agricultural practice is protected by the Right to Farm Act (§823.14) and, where it is covered by adopted Best Management Practices, by §823.14(6)’s limit on duplicative regulation, and agricultural land management consistent with normal practice falls within the §373.406(2) exemption.

And the “contamination” label runs into a jurisdictional wall of its own. Setting the standards for evaluating “contamination” on agricultural land is not a power a county holds. Section 403.182(11), Florida Statutes — added by HB 909 (2022), Chapter 2022-127 — gives the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection exclusive jurisdiction to set the standards and procedures for evaluating environmental conditions and assessing potential liability for the presence of contaminants on land classified as agricultural under §193.461 that is being converted to a nonagricultural use, and expressly bars the Secretary from delegating that authority to a county, municipality, or local pollution control program. Miami-Dade’s environmental enforcement operates as a local pollution control program under Chapter 403, which creates a dilemma the county cannot escape: if it contends this land is being converted to a nonagricultural use so that it can be treated as a contaminated site, §403.182(11) places the contamination standards and liability assessment with DEP alone — not with the county, and not by delegation; and if the land is not being converted but remains a bona fide farm, there is no development-and-contamination scenario to justify calling permitted agricultural mulch “contamination” at all, and the agricultural exemption and Right to Farm protections govern. (The statute does not strip a local program of its other existing enforcement powers; the point is directed at who may set contamination standards and assess contaminant liability on this agricultural land — which is DEP.)

2. The de minimis exemption — §373.406(6), F.S. Separately, activities with only minimal or insignificant individual or cumulative adverse effects on the District’s water resources are exempt.

3. No jurisdictional wetland has been shown — F.A.C. Chapter 62-340 (natural hydrology). Even apart from the exemption, the District must first prove a jurisdictional wetland under the statewide methodology, and the wetland must arise from natural hydrology. In the former 8.5 Square Mile Area (Las Palmas) the water regime is federally engineered (Public Law 101-229 / Modified Water Deliveries), so managed, artificial water cannot supply the wetland predicate. See the natural-hydrology foundation and the Las Palmas analysis elsewhere in this manual.

4. The broader agricultural protections. The Right to Farm Act (§823.14, including §823.14(6)) limits duplicative regulation of farm operations, and the Agricultural Lands and Practices Act (§163.3162) limits local prohibition of bona fide farms — protections especially relevant where the District and a county program pursue the same land together.

5. The federal layer — and why it is the District’s law, not the point against it. At the federal level, the Clean Water Act §404(f) (33 U.S.C. §1344(f)) similarly exempts normal farming, ranching, and silviculture from federal dredge-and-fill permitting, and Public Law 101-229 governs the federal water-delivery project that engineered this area’s hydrology. Those federal provisions govern the federal programs (the U.S. Army Corps’ §404 program and the National Park water deliveries), not the District’s state ERP program. That is precisely the point: each agency is answered under its own law, and the consistent policy across all three levels — local, state, and federal — is that bona fide agriculture is protected.

6. How each protection applies to the District specifically. The no-entry protection is a good example of why the agency matters. The District’s Investigative Notice does not assert a right to enter — it asks the owner to “grant District staff access to the property.” It is seeking consent. The owner may decline, require the District to establish and follow lawful authority (an administrative inspection warrant that identifies what may be inspected and why), and insist that any inspection stay within that authority — while noting the open-fields limit for land beyond a home’s curtilage, and never obstructing anyone acting under a valid warrant. The burden to prove jurisdiction and a violation stays on the District; the owner admits nothing; and the owner may obtain the District’s file through a Chapter 119 records request.

The evidence at a glance. The authorities and protections that restrict the District on this bona fide agricultural land, and the level of law each comes from:

Authority or protection	Level	Effect on the District (SFWMD)
§373.406(2), F.S.	State statute	Express exemption from ERP permitting for agricultural topography alteration on land classified agricultural under §193.461 — including alteration that may adversely impact wetlands — unless its sole or predominant purpose is to obstruct/divert surface water or adversely impact wetlands. Applies to activities “requiring an environmental resource permit pursuant to this part.”
§373.406(6), F.S.	State statute	Exempts activities that have only minimal or insignificant individual or cumulative adverse effects on the District’s water resources.
F.A.C. 62-340.500, .550, .300(3)(a)	State rule	A jurisdictional wetland must reflect natural hydrology; a delineation may be refuted by hydrologic records showing no ~7-day inundation or ~20-day saturation under long-term conditions, and managed or engineered water is weighed against natural conditions.
§823.14(6), F.S. — Right to Farm Act	State statute	Limits duplication of regulation over bona fide farm operations.
§163.3162, F.S. — Agricultural Lands and Practices Act	State statute	Limits county/municipal prohibition of bona fide farm operations — directly relevant to the coordinated county (DERM) action.
§403.182(11), F.S. — HB 909 (2022), Ch. 2022-127	State statute	Gives the DEP Secretary exclusive, non-delegable authority to set standards and procedures for evaluating environmental conditions and assessing contaminant liability on §193.461 agricultural land being converted to nonagricultural use — a county or local pollution control program (DERM) may not set or apply its own “contamination” standard on such land.
Part IV, Ch. 373 — §§373.403, 373.413, 373.416, 373.430	State statute	The District’s ERP authority reaches only jurisdictional “works” in waters of the State, and is subject to the exemptions above; it must be proven, not assumed.
§373.441, F.S. / Rule 62-344, F.A.C.	State statute/rule	Delegation of ERP authority runs to local governments. The District has direct authority and needs no delegation; the delegation question belongs to Miami-Dade DERM, not the District.
FDEP ERP Local Program Delegation record	State agency record	Miami-Dade’s only adopted delegation is for Sovereign Submerged Lands; a full county ERP delegation is listed “In Discussion” (not adopted) — so DERM cannot claim delegated state ERP authority either.
Clean Water Act §404(f), 33 U.S.C. §1344(f)	Federal statute	Exempts normal farming, ranching, and silviculture from federal dredge-and-fill permitting — governs the U.S. Army Corps’ §404 program, not the District’s state ERP, illustrating a consistent policy across levels.
Public Law 101-229	Federal statute	Authorized the federal water-delivery and flood-mitigation project that engineered this area’s hydrology — factual support that present water is managed, not natural.
No voluntary entry (Fourth Amendment; lawful process)	Constitutional / procedural	The District’s Investigative Notice asks the owner to “grant District staff access” — it seeks consent. The owner may decline and require the District to establish and follow lawful authority (an administrative inspection warrant), subject to the open-fields limit for land beyond a home’s curtilage.

Maria’s model response letter to the District

This keeps the assertive substance of a real landowner response — jurisdiction reserved, agricultural protection asserted, access conditioned on lawful authority, a full records request, and a complete reservation of rights — and sharpens each point to the version that is hardest to dismiss. It corrects several missteps that weaken such letters: it treats Public Law 101-229 as factual support for the engineered hydrology rather than as “preemption”; it puts the §373.441 delegation question where it belongs (the county’s role), since the District has direct ERP authority; it leads the agricultural defense with the on-point ERP exemption in §373.406(2); and it asserts the right to require lawful process for entry without overstating it as an automatic crime.

Maria [Surname], Successor Trustee
[Trust / Farm Name]
[Property mailing address]
[City, FL ZIP]

[Date]

[Name], Environmental Resource Bureau
South Florida Water Management District
3301 Gun Club Road
West Palm Beach, FL 33406
[Sent by certified mail and email]

Re: Response to Investigative Notice — Enforcement Case No. [___], Folio No. [___]. Jurisdiction reserved; agricultural exemption asserted; access conditioned on lawful authority; public-records request. Submitted without prejudice and under protest.

Dear [Name]:

This responds to the District’s Investigative Notice dated [date]. Responding to the Notice, and requesting the records below, is not consent to the District’s jurisdiction and is not an admission that any wetland, regulated “works,” or unauthorized filling exists on the property. All rights, defenses, and objections are expressly reserved.

1. The law binds the agency, too — an investigative notice is not proof.

A government notice states a conclusion; it is not evidence of the facts required to support that conclusion. Before any obligation to permit or to restore can arise, the District must establish, with competent evidence and under the governing rule, that an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) is actually required here — that a jurisdictional wetland or regulated “works” exists at the precise location of the alleged activity. The landowner denies each unproven conclusion in the Notice and requires the District to prove every element on the record. The landowner does not concede jurisdiction, and nothing in any response, meeting, or site contact may be treated as such a concession.

2. This is a bona fide farm, and agricultural activity is exempt from ERP permitting.

The property is in bona fide agricultural use. Section 373.406(2), Florida Statutes, exempts the alteration of land for normal agricultural purposes from the Part IV ERP permitting the District invokes. In addition, the Florida Right to Farm Act (§823.14, F.S., including the duplication-of-regulation limits in §823.14(6)) and the Agricultural Lands and Practices Act (§163.3162, F.S.) protect bona fide farm operations from duplicative and local regulation — a protection that is squarely in play where a county program (Miami-Dade DERM) and the District are pursuing the same land in a coordinated enforcement effort. The landowner requests that the District state, in writing, whether it evaluated the agricultural exemption before issuing the Notice and the specific factual and legal basis on which it contends the exemption does not apply.

To the extent any “filling” is alleged, the material at issue is permitted agricultural mulch — organic material applied as a normal agricultural practice for soil health, moisture, and weed control. It is not regulated fill placed to raise grade or impound water, and it is neither “debris” (discarded solid waste) nor “contamination” (a pollutant regulated under Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes). The landowner does not concede that any regulated fill, debris, or contamination exists, and requires the District to identify and prove, with competent evidence, that the specific material is regulated fill that altered a jurisdictional wetland — not permitted agricultural mulch used in the farm operation.

3. No natural wetland has been shown — the water regime here is government-engineered.

The property lies within the former 8.5 Square Mile Area (the Las Palmas Community), where the water regime is the product of a federal, government-engineered water-delivery and flood-control system — the Modified Water Deliveries and related seepage-management works authorized in connection with Public Law 101-229. A jurisdictional wetland must arise from natural hydrology. Under F.A.C. Chapter 62-340, water that is present because of a man-made, engineered, or managed water-control system is managed, artificial water, not the regular, naturally occurring wetness the methodology is meant to identify. F.A.C. 62-340.550 provides that a wetland delineation may be refuted by reliable hydrologic records or site-specific data showing the area does not inundate for at least seven consecutive days, nor saturate for at least twenty consecutive days, under long-term conditions; and F.A.C. 62-340.500 requires managed and unusual water to be weighed against natural conditions so it is not counted as the wetness that defines a wetland. The District must therefore prove natural wetland hydrology at the exact location — not water attributable to the engineered system — before it can assert an unauthorized-filling violation. Public Law 101-229 is cited here as factual and historical support for the engineered hydrology of this area; it is not asserted as federal preemption of the District’s program.

4. Produce the basis for the authority claimed.

To the extent the District asserts authority over this property, the landowner requests that it produce the statutory basis relied upon and any delegation or interagency agreements bearing on this matter. (Section 373.441, F.S., and Rule 62-344, F.A.C., govern the delegation of ERP authority to local governments — directly relevant to Miami-Dade DERM’s role in this coordinated action; the District should identify precisely which agency claims which authority, and under what instrument.)

5. Access is conditioned on lawful authority; consent is withheld.

Consistent with the right to require lawful process, the landowner does not consent to entry onto the property at this time. If the District believes entry is necessary, it may pursue lawful authority — an administrative inspection warrant — identifying what may be inspected and why. This is a request that the District proceed by lawful process; it is not obstruction, and the landowner will not interfere with anyone acting under a valid warrant. Any site access that may later be permitted is expressly without waiver of any right and without consent to the District’s jurisdiction, and the landowner asks to be present and to document any inspection.

6. Public-records request (Chapter 119, F.S.).

The landowner requests copies of the following public records:

1. All delegation or interagency agreements bearing on ERP or wetland jurisdiction over the subject property or over bona fide agricultural land, including any agreements under §373.441, F.S., and Rule 62-344, F.A.C.
2. All communications (emails, letters, memoranda, meeting notes) among the District, Miami-Dade County DERM, FDEP, and any federal agency regarding this enforcement case or the subject property.
3. All inspection reports, delineations, field-data forms, maps, aerial or ground photographs, GIS data, and field notes relating to Folio No. [___].
4. All internal legal memoranda, policies, or procedural documents relied upon to assert ERP jurisdiction over bona fide agricultural operations.
5. Records identifying the authority under which Investigative Notices are issued and enforcement actions are conducted in this matter.

Please provide these records in electronic format to [email], or by mail to the address above. If estimated costs will exceed $50, please provide an itemized estimate before proceeding.

7. Reservation of rights.

This response is submitted without prejudice and under protest. It is not an admission of any wetland, regulated “works,” or violation, and it is not a waiver of any right, exemption, defense, or objection. The landowner reserves all rights and remedies available under state and federal law, including the right to seek administrative and judicial review and any other lawful remedy, should the District proceed without first establishing lawful authority and a jurisdictional basis as requested here.

Sincerely,

Maria [Surname], Successor Trustee
[Trust / Farm Name]
[email] · [phone]

This is a model letter for educational and informational use only. It is not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Verify current law, rules, deadlines, and the specific facts before using or adapting it, and consult a licensed Florida attorney.

Educational and informational use only — not legal advice. Verify current law, procedure, and deadlines.

A complete strategy for challenging a Class IV permit on classified agricultural land

This section combines the remaining defenses, but they are secondary or alternative to the central wetland-predicate issue. Start with the County's Chapter 24 charge and require the record to establish the alleged wetland under the binding statewide definition and F.A.C. Chapter 62-340 methodology. Only after that predicate is isolated should the respondent layer in agricultural protections, the precise source of local versus state permit authority, federal issues, procedural due process, evidentiary objections, and other defenses that fit the facts. A strong record separates these theories instead of allowing them to obscure the threshold F.A.C. 62-340 question.

1. Primary Florida-law issue — the F.A.C. 62-340 wetland predicate

• Identify the authority; home rule is not Environmental Resource Permit. The county's Class IV power comes from its own Chapter 24 ordinance under home rule, not from delegated state Environmental Resource Permit authority. Require DERM to state its exact authority. If any part of its case is based on the state Environmental Resource Permit (Chapter 373 or Rule 62-330), require the delegation instrument; if there is none, that theory fails. (See "The county's authority" and "The Environmental Resource Permit-delegation and wetland-definition arguments.")
• Statewide definition and method (Section 373.421). Florida has one ratified wetland definition and one delineation method (Chapter 62-340), binding on local governments, which are preempted from using their own. Require DERM to use the statewide definition and Chapter 62-340, not a broader local definition, and to prove the delineation with field data, indicators, sample points, and reasonable scientific judgment.
• The state Environmental Resource Permit agricultural exemption (Section 373.406(2)). Normal and customary agricultural work on Section 193.461 land is exempt from the state Environmental Resource Permit, unless it is mainly to block or divert surface water or harm wetlands. Consider requesting a binding FDACS determination (Section 373.407).
• Agricultural preemption (Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6)). A county generally may not separately regulate an activity of a bona fide farm operation on Section 193.461 land that is covered by adopted state best management practices, or expressly regulated by the USDA, the Army Corps, or the EPA. Establish that the activity is ordinary farming covered by best management practices, not a new conversion.
• No deference to the agency (Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 21). Since 2018, a Florida court — and an officer hearing an administrative action under general law — may not defer to an agency's interpretation of a state statute or rule, and must interpret it independently (de novo). Because a Class IV defense turns heavily on state statutes and rules (the preemption statutes, the Environmental Resource Permit exemption, and Chapter 62-340), DERM's own broad reading of those state provisions gets no deference, and the reviewing court interprets them fresh. Note: whether this provision also governs interpretation of the county's own Chapter 24 ordinance (a local law) is unsettled, so do not overstate it.
• Prove the exact act. Wetland status is not a violation. Require proof of the specific regulated act — what was done, when, where, by whom, and how much — not just the presence of a wetland.

2. Secondary and alternative defenses — use only where the facts and record support them

2A. The federal-jurisdiction arguments (aimed at any federal or Section 404 claim)

• Sackett v. EPA (2023). Federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction over wetlands now requires a continuous surface connection to a relatively permanent water that is connected to a traditional navigable water. Roads, berms, levees, and fill can interrupt or break that connection. If a federal wetland claim is made, require the specific water body and proof of the unbroken surface connection. Important limit: Sackett narrows federal jurisdiction only. Florida and the county can still regulate isolated wetlands that the federal government cannot, so Sackett defeats a federal Section 404 claim but does not by itself defeat the county's Class IV. It can also weaken the Section 163.3162 preemption argument, because if the Army Corps has no jurisdiction, the activity is not "expressly regulated" by the Corps — though the state-best management practice part of that preemption may still apply.
• The Florida Section 404 vacatur (Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA / Regan). In 2024 a federal court vacated EPA's approval of Florida's assumption of the Section 404 dredge-and-fill program, and in 2026 the D.C. Circuit affirmed. As a result, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers — not FDEP — currently administers Section 404 permitting in Florida. So any claim that is based on FDEP's Section 404 authority relies on authority that has been vacated. If the agency invokes Section 404, require it to identify which program it means and to show current authorization. Use this together with Sackett. Important limit: this concerns the federal Section 404 program only; it does not by itself affect the separate state Environmental Resource Permit or the county Class IV program.

2B. The interpretation and hearing-structure arguments (supporting)

• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024). The U.S. Supreme Court ended Chevron deference: federal courts now independently interpret a statute's meaning and do not defer to an agency's reading of its own authority. For any federal-law question, this reinforces that the agency gets no automatic deference to an expansive reading of its scope. It works together with Florida's Article V, Section 21 for state-law questions.
• The major-questions doctrine (reflected in decisions such as West Virginia v. EPA, 2022). For regulatory actions of large economic or political significance, an agency needs clear authorization from the legislature and cannot create that power by broad interpretation alone. Limit: this doctrine is about major, sweeping regulatory actions, and its direct application to a single local permit is unlikely. Use the underlying principle — clear authority is required, and an agency cannot expand its own reach — as support, not as a controlling rule.
• SEC v. Jarkesy (2024). The U.S. Supreme Court expressed constitutional concern about agencies that investigate, prosecute, and decide the same case within the same agency. This supports objections to an unfair hearing structure and to a lack of a neutral decision-maker. Limit: Jarkesy's actual holding concerned a federal agency seeking civil penalties for fraud and the right to a jury; it does not squarely govern a local land-use hearing. Use it to strengthen a due-process objection, not as a rule that decides the case.

2C. The property-rights arguments (usually separate or parallel claims)

• Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District (2013). This Florida case holds that when a permit is conditioned on a demand — including a demand for money or for work such as mitigation or restoration — that demand must have an essential connection (nexus) and rough proportionality to the actual impact of the project. This applies even when the permit is denied for refusing the demand. It is directly useful against a Class IV mitigation or restoration condition that is not connected and proportional to a real, proven impact.
• Regulatory takings (Penn Central, Lucas, Stop the Beach). If a wetland classification or restoration order destroys the use or value of the property, a regulatory-takings claim may exist: a multi-factor test (Penn Central), a per-se claim if all economic value is destroyed (Lucas), and Florida property protections (Stop the Beach). Limit: takings claims usually require a final decision (ripeness) and are brought as separate proceedings — for example, an inverse-condemnation suit or a claim under Florida's Bert J. Harris Act (Section 70.001) — not as a defense that cancels the permit at the administrative hearing.
• Executive Orders 12630 and 11990. Executive Order 12630 directs federal agencies to review the takings implications of their actions; Executive Order 11990 directs federal agencies to avoid and document decisions affecting wetlands. Limit: these bind federal agencies and generally do not create rights a private party can enforce in court. They matter only where a federal agency is involved, as process expectations — not as enforceable limits on the county.

How to use these at the hearing

• Put each argument in writing and on the record, ask for a ruling on each, and if evidence or an argument is excluded, make a proffer so it is preserved. First-tier certiorari review looks only at the record, so an argument that never enters the record is usually lost. (See "Before the hearing," "During the hearing," and "Writ of Certiorari — how to obtain Circuit Court review.")
• Request the records first. The delineation, the authority, and the impact cannot be tested without the file. (See "How to get the agency's records.")
• Do not rely on any single argument. Some of these are strong and settled; others are uncertain as applied to a local hearing. Raised together and preserved, they require the county to prove authority, jurisdiction, the correct definition and method, the exact act, and the basis for any condition.
• Do not make admissions. Get advice before signing an after-the-fact permit application, a consent order, or a restoration agreement, because doing so can concede the very points in dispute.

Bottom line

Used together, these arguments give a farmer a serious, well-founded challenge to a Class IV permit demand on classified agricultural land. But be realistic about each one. The most directly useful are the Florida arguments: home rule is not Environmental Resource Permit, the statewide definition and method under Section 373.421, the Section 373.406(2) exemption, the Section 163.3162 and Section 823.14(6) preemption, no deference under Article V, Section 21, and strict proof of the act. The federal cases — Sackett and the Section 404 vacatur — are powerful against a federal claim but do not, by themselves, remove the county's separate authority. The interpretation and hearing-structure cases — Loper Bright, major questions, Jarkesy — are supporting arguments whose reach to a local hearing is uncertain. The property-rights claims — Koontz, takings, the executive orders — mostly belong in separate proceedings and have their own timing and ripeness rules. None of this is a guaranteed cancellation, and none of it is legal advice. The realistic goal is to require the county to prove every part of its case and to justify every demand, and to preserve each point for court — with a Florida land-use and environmental attorney applying these to the actual notice.

Useful term. Continuous surface connection. After Sackett v. EPA (2023), a wetland is covered by the federal Clean Water Act only if it has an unbroken surface connection to a relatively permanent water that connects to a traditional navigable water. A road, berm, levee, or area of fill that separates the wetland can defeat federal jurisdiction — but not necessarily state or county jurisdiction.

Abbreviations used in this manual

Every abbreviation used in this manual is listed here with its full meaning. Agency names and statutory short forms are defined once below; the plain glossary that follows explains key legal terms.

BMP

Best Management Practice. A state-adopted agricultural practice, interim measure, or regulation. When the charged activity is already regulated through an implemented BMP, §823.14(6) and §163.3162 limit duplicative local permitting.

DBHYDRO

The South Florida Water Management District's hydrologic and water-quality database — rainfall, canal stages, pump operations, and water-level records.

DCA

District Court of Appeal — Florida's intermediate appellate court. The Third DCA hears certiorari petitions from Miami-Dade administrative decisions.

DERM

Department of Environmental Resources Management — Miami-Dade County's environmental regulator, now part of the Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources (RER). It issues the Notice of Violation used in these cases.

EPA

United States Environmental Protection Agency.

ERP

Environmental Resource Permit — the Florida state or water-management-district permit for activities that affect wetlands or other waters.

F.A.C.

Florida Administrative Code — for example, Chapter 62-340, the statewide wetland-delineation methodology.

FDACS

Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.

FDEP

Florida Department of Environmental Protection — the state environmental agency.

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency — the source of flood-zone and elevation data.

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act — the federal records law. It applies to federal agencies, not to Miami-Dade County; use a Chapter 119 public-records request for county records.

F.S.

Florida Statutes — for example, §373.406(2), F.S.

GIS

Geographic Information System — mapping and data layers, which are not the same as a field delineation.

GPS

Global Positioning System.

MDC

Miami-Dade County.

NOV

Notice of Violation — the document that usually starts an enforcement case.

NRCS

Natural Resources Conservation Service — an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

NWI

National Wetlands Inventory — the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's federal wetland maps.

RER

Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources — the Miami-Dade County department that now includes DERM.

SFWMD

South Florida Water Management District.

SMA

Square Mile Area — as in the “8.5 Square Mile Area,” now the Las Palmas Community.

U.S.C.

United States Code — for example, 11 U.S.C. § 362, the bankruptcy automatic stay.

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture.

USFWS

United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

Plain glossary

Administrative hearing

A formal proceeding before a government agency or a hearing officer, not a regular court, to decide a dispute such as an alleged violation.

Notice of Violation

The document that usually starts an enforcement case. It says what the respondent allegedly did wrong and what the agency wants.

Respondent

The person the case is brought against — in the example, Maria.

Statutory authority

A specific law that gives an agency the power to act.

Ultra vires

Latin for acting beyond one's legal authority. An action taken without authority can be challenged regardless of the evidence.

Delegation

Written authority passed from one agency to another — for example, from the state to a county department.

Jurisdiction

The places and subjects an agency is legally allowed to regulate.

Wetland delineation

The process of determining the boundary of a wetland. In Florida this is done under F.A.C. 62-340, Florida Administrative Code.

F.A.C. 62-340, F.A.C.

The Florida rule that sets the method for identifying the extent of wetlands and surface waters.

Folio number

Miami-Dade County's identification number for a specific piece of property.

Methodology

The documented, step-by-step procedure used to reach a technical conclusion, such as where a wetland line is.

Evidence / exhibit

Documents, photos, maps, or testimony presented in the case. An exhibit is a specific numbered item of evidence.

Foundation

Proof of where a piece of evidence came from and that it is reliable, offered before the evidence is relied on.

Admitted

Formally accepted into the case so that it can be relied on. Material that is not admitted should not be used to decide the case.

Administrative record

The complete official file of the case: exhibits, transcript, motions, and orders. Findings and appeals are based only on this file.

Findings of fact

The decision-maker's written statements about what happened.

Conclusions of law

The decision-maker's legal rulings, based on the findings of fact.

Motion for rehearing

A written request asking the same office to reconsider its decision, pointing out specific mistakes. In the Miami-Dade code enforcement process this is generally not available and does not extend the thirty-day deadline to seek certiorari review in circuit court.

Appeal

Review of the decision by a court, based only on the record. For a Miami-Dade code enforcement order, review is by a petition for writ of certiorari to the circuit court, filed within thirty days.

Standard of review

How much weight a court gives the agency's decision on appeal. For factual findings, courts often ask only whether there is enough reliable evidence to support them.

Preservation

Raising an issue at the right time and getting it written into the record, so that a court can review it later. Issues not preserved are usually lost.

Mitigation credits / mitigation banking

A system in which restoring or protecting wetlands generates credits that others can buy to offset environmental impacts elsewhere. This is the system the author argues creates an incentive to over-regulate.

Environmental Resource Permit

A Florida permit, issued by the state environmental agency or a water management district, for activities that affect wetlands or other water resources.

FDEP

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the state environmental agency.

DERM

Miami-Dade County's environmental regulatory department, which issues the kind of Notice of Violation used in the example.

Public records request (Chapter 119)

A request to inspect or copy government records under Florida's Public Records Act. Anyone may ask, a requester does not have to give a reason or be a Florida resident, and the agency must produce non-exempt records or cite a specific legal exemption for anything it withholds.

FOIA

The federal Freedom of Information Act. It applies only to federal agencies (such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), not to Miami-Dade County or Florida state agencies. For county and state records, use a Florida public records request instead.

Section 373.406(2), F.S. (agricultural exemption)

Florida's exemption that lets normal and customary agricultural, silvicultural, floricultural, and horticultural topographic work proceed without a state Environmental Resource Permit, on land classified agricultural under Section 193.461. It does not apply if the work is mainly to block or divert surface water or to harm wetlands.

Section 373.407, F.S. (FDACS determination)

A procedure to ask the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services for a binding decision on whether an activity qualifies for the Section 373.406(2) agricultural exemption.

Section 373.421(2), F.S. (formal determination)

A procedure to ask the state or the water management district for a binding determination of the wetland and surface-water boundary on a property — generally binding for up to five years if physical conditions do not change.

Section 193.461, F.S. (agricultural classification)

Florida's agricultural property-tax classification. It is evidence of genuine agricultural use and is referenced by the Section 373.406(2) exemption, but by itself it does not exempt any particular activity from a permit.

Clean Water Act Section 404(f)

The federal exemption for established, ongoing normal farming, ranching, and silviculture from the federal dredge-and-fill permit. A “recapture” rule can still require a permit if the work brings a wetland into a new use that impairs the flow or reach of waters.

Home rule

The broad power of a charter county such as Miami-Dade to pass its own ordinances for public health, safety, and welfare, as long as they do not conflict with general state law. Chapter 24 is a home-rule ordinance.

Preemption (agricultural)

State statutes — the Agricultural Lands and Practices Act (Section 163.3162) and the Right to Farm Act (Section 823.14(6)) — that limit a county from separately regulating bona fide farm activities on Section 193.461 land that are already covered by state best management practices or federal regulation.

Environmental Resource Permit delegation

When the state (FDEP or a water management district) formally gives a local government authority to run part of the state Environmental Resource Permit program. It is different from home rule, and a county's Class IV wetland program does not depend on it.

Statewide wetland definition and method (Section 373.421)

Florida has one legislatively ratified wetland definition and one delineation method (Chapter 62-340). They are binding on local governments, which are preempted from adopting their own wetland definition or delineation method.

Sackett v. EPA (2023)

A U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the federal Clean Water Act covers a wetland only if it has a continuous surface connection to a relatively permanent water connected to a traditional navigable water. It narrows federal jurisdiction but does not limit state or county wetland authority.

Unconstitutional conditions (Koontz)

Under Koontz v. St. Johns River WMD (2013), a permit condition — including a demand for money, mitigation, or restoration — must have an essential connection and rough proportionality to the project’s actual impact, even if the permit is denied for refusing the demand.

Disclaimer

This guide is for general information and education only. It does not give legal advice and does not create a lawyer-client relationship. It is a plain-language summary of a manual written by others, and it includes both practical procedure and the manual author's own arguments, which are identified as such.

Rules, deadlines, and procedures differ by agency and can change. The examples are invented and are only meant to illustrate how a check works; they are not predictions about any real case. Always confirm the current rules and talk to a licensed attorney before acting on any enforcement matter, hearing, or environmental-compliance question.