Wetland Misclassification
Defense Playbook

Educational Scenario 5 — Integrated Chapter 24 / §24-48 Home Rule + NO ENTRY + Compulsory Access

For educational purposes only. Not legal advice.

Assume an agricultural landowner with a current §193.461 agricultural classification receives a Miami-Dade DERM Notice of Violation alleging that clearing, farming, filling, grading, or other activity occurred in a wetland without a Class IV permit. The owner raises agricultural protections, USDA/NRCS evidence, and Florida’s Rule 62-340 wetland methodology. DERM invokes Miami-Dade home-rule Chapter 24 / §24-48 as its local enforcement authority and then requests entry to inspect, photograph, sample, evaluate vegetation, examine soils, investigate hydrology, or delineate a wetland boundary. The owner disputes wetland status and the asserted boundary, denies voluntary consent, and requires DERM to establish whatever lawful authority it relies upon for compulsory access.

Challenge DERM at every stage and concede nothing the County is legally required to prove. Do not voluntarily supply missing evidence, consent to entry, accept wetland status, accept a boundary, or assume a Class IV permit was required merely because DERM says so. Require DERM to identify its authority, evidence, Rule 62-340 pathway, scientific basis, and the exact facts supporting every element of the alleged violation. If a valid warrant or court order is issued, comply while preserving every objection and continue challenging whether the resulting evidence actually proves DERM's case.

1. Start with DERM’s asserted Chapter 24 / §24-48 enforcement theory. DERM’s local enforcement position is fixed at the outset: Miami-Dade home-rule Chapter 24 / §24-48. The owner does not need to ask whether DERM is proceeding under the state ERP program. Instead, require the County to identify the precise local provision charged, then keep that local authority separate from Florida’s statewide wetland definition and delineation methodology and from the later entry / inspection question.
2. Acknowledge what home rule actually gives Miami-Dade. Do not base the defense on the proposition that Miami-Dade has no local environmental authority. Chapter 24 is the County's local environmental regulatory framework. The dispute is whether the precise Chapter 24 provision invoked applies to the facts and whether local enforcement remains consistent with controlling state law.
3. Identify the limit: home rule remains subject to controlling general law. Even when DERM relies on local Chapter 24 authority, the County must operate consistently with applicable general state law and express state preemption. Home rule may answer who may regulate, but it does not automatically decide how a wetland must be defined or delineated.
4. Invoke §373.421's statewide wetland methodology. Section 373.421 makes Florida's wetland definition and delineation methodology binding on local governments and preempts development of a separate local wetland definition or delineation methodology. Local Chapter 24 authority therefore does not itself authorize DERM to substitute a GIS label, regional map, staff impression, or Class IV allegation for the statewide method.
5. Distinguish “who may regulate” from “what land is a wetland”. DERM may say Chapter 24 authorizes local regulation of work in wetlands. The owner asks the next question: what establishes that the particular land being regulated is legally wetland under the statewide methodology that binds Miami-Dade?
6. Force DERM through Rule 62-340. Require DERM to identify the Rule 62-340.300 pathway actually relied upon, the evidence satisfying that pathway, and the scientific reasoning that establishes the asserted parcel boundary. “Home rule” is not itself a scientific methodology, and the Class IV allegation does not substitute for the wetland determination.
7. Reject circular permit reasoning. Do not accept: “A Class IV permit was required because work occurred in wetlands” followed by “we know it was wetland because Chapter 24 required a Class IV permit.” The permit requirement cannot serve as its own proof of the jurisdictional fact that triggers the permit requirement.
8. On agricultural land, confront the preserved-wetland-ordinance exception directly. Section 163.3162(3)(i) preserves county power to enforce qualifying wetland ordinances adopted before July 1, 2003. DERM may invoke that exception. Do not ignore it, but do not concede that every present-day Chapter 24 enforcement theory automatically falls within it.
9. Preservation of a local ordinance does not create a different wetland definition. The agricultural-preemption exception does not authorize Miami-Dade to invent a separate wetland definition or delineation methodology. Section 373.421 still binds local governments to Florida's statewide methodology.
10. Make DERM identify exactly what it says is grandfathered. Require the precise ordinance, section, adoption date, relevant amendments, regulated activity, and statutory basis DERM says preserves the local prohibition as applied to this case. “Chapter 24 predates 2003” should not substitute for identifying the specific legal provision actually charged.
11. Keep the state ERP agricultural exemption separate. DERM may argue that a §373.406(2) exemption from the state ERP program does not automatically erase an independent local requirement. Preserve the state exemption while continuing to challenge whether the local ordinance applies and whether DERM has proved every predicate fact.
12. Keep USDA/NRCS evidence in the case. DERM's invocation of home rule does not make USDA/NRCS soils, prior-converted-cropland determinations, conservation records, historical agricultural use, hydrology records, or other federal agricultural information irrelevant. They may not automatically control the Chapter 24 determination, but they remain technical and historical evidence that DERM should be required to confront when applying the statewide methodology.
13. DERM now requests voluntary access — NO ENTRY remains the owner's position. DERM asks to enter the property to inspect, photograph, sample, evaluate vegetation, examine soils, investigate hydrology, or delineate a wetland boundary. The owner does not voluntarily consent. The owner requires DERM to identify the precise Chapter 24 inspection provision or other lawful authority it claims permits entry. Refusing voluntary consent does not concede that DERM's inspection authority applies, and it does not supply the County with the missing field evidence it seeks to create.
14. Make DERM identify the exact local inspection authority it relies upon. If DERM invokes Miami-Dade Code §24-48.11, require it to identify the exact subsection, the alleged work that supposedly triggers that subsection, the authorized personnel and credentials, the purpose of entry, and the proposed scope. Keep subsection (1), which contains general compliance-inspection language, separate from subsection (2), which concerns periodic inspections during work for which a permit has actually been issued.
15. If DERM seeks compulsory access under Chapter 933, require the affidavit mandated by §933.21. Florida §933.21 provides that an inspection warrant may issue only upon cause supported by affidavit. Require the actual affidavit. It must particularly describe the property or premises to be inspected, state the purpose of the inspection, and state that consent was sought and refused or set out facts reasonably explaining why consent was not first sought. The affidavit matters because it fixes the sworn factual basis DERM presented to obtain compulsory access.
16. Separate the affidavit's facts from DERM's conclusions. Identify who signed the affidavit, what the affiant personally knew, the source and date of each material assertion, any complaint, photograph, map, aerial, observation, alleged work, or other information relied upon, and the facts connecting those matters to this parcel. Challenge conclusory labels such as “wetland,” “wetland fill,” “regulated work,” or “Class IV violation” when the affidavit does not disclose the facts underlying those conclusions.
17. Challenge statutory cause under §933.22 without confusing the warrant stage with the final wetland case. Section 933.22 permits inspection-warrant cause based on qualifying reasonable inspection standards or reason to believe a covered condition of nonconformity exists. DERM therefore does not necessarily have to complete the entire Rule 62-340 merits case before requesting investigative authority. But if DERM relies on an alleged wetland violation to establish cause, require it to disclose the preexisting facts that gave it reason to believe the property contained the alleged regulated condition.
18. Require the judicial determination contemplated by §933.23. Section 933.23 requires the judge to examine the applicant and any other witness under oath and determine whether grounds exist for the requested inspection warrant. Preserve the question of what sworn evidence was actually presented and whether those facts supported the statutory ground DERM claimed.
19. Hold DERM to the warrant's place, purpose, and limitations under §933.24. The warrant must particularly describe the property and designate the purpose and limitations of the inspection. Preserve a copy and compare what DERM actually does against the authorization granted. Authority to inspect a specified condition or area should not simply be treated as unlimited authorization for unrelated entry, searches, sampling, photography, or inspection outside the warrant's terms.
20. Check the timing, notice, and execution requirements in §§933.25 and 933.26. The statutory framework regulates how long an inspection warrant remains effective and how it may be executed. It includes a general 14-day maximum absent a proper extension or renewal and contains timing, notice, presence, and execution requirements, including a 24-hour notice provision after prior consent has been sought and refused, subject to the statutory exception. Preserve any issue involving expiration, notice, time of execution, scope, or the manner of execution.
21. If a valid warrant or court order is issued, comply while preserving every objection. NO ENTRY concerns voluntary consent; it is not an instruction to disregard lawful compulsory process. If a valid warrant, court order, or other valid compulsory authority is issued, the owner complies. Compliance does not concede wetland status, the validity of DERM's scientific methodology, the location of a wetland boundary, agricultural applicability, or liability. The owner preserves challenges to issuance, scope, execution, and the later use of evidence through lawful procedures.
22. Preserve the additional safeguards contained in Chapter 933. Chapter 933 contains additional provisions governing the inspection-warrant process, including §933.27 concerning compliance with a lawful warrant, §933.28 concerning malicious or knowing procurement of a warrant without cause, and §933.30 concerning specified later uses of information obtained through the inspection. These provisions reinforce that compulsory inspection has a defined purpose, procedure, and legal scope.
23. Use Camara for the administrative-inspection principle. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), recognizes that administrative inspections of constitutionally protected premises implicate the Fourth Amendment and that an ordinance's claimed right of entry does not, by itself, eliminate constitutional process. Camara also recognizes that administrative-warrant probable cause differs from criminal probable cause, so insist on the lawful warrant process without overstating the preliminary burden as though DERM must already have proved the entire wetland violation.
24. Use Marshall v. Barlow's for protected nonpublic commercial or working areas. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), applies administrative-warrant principles to protected nonpublic commercial working areas and recognizes that an administrative warrant may rest on specific evidence or a reasonable neutral inspection program. The owner therefore insists on proper process while recognizing the distinction between sufficient cause to investigate and sufficient proof to establish the eventual violation.
25. Address the federal open-fields doctrine directly. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), holds that open fields do not receive the same Fourth Amendment protection as houses and constitutionally protected curtilage, and fences or “No Trespassing” signs alone do not create a federal Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in an open field. The owner therefore should not claim that the Fourth Amendment automatically requires a warrant for every acre of rural or agricultural property.
26. Do not let the open-fields doctrine become a substitute for local authority or scientific proof. Oliver answers a federal Fourth Amendment privacy question. It does not itself grant Miami-Dade Chapter 24 jurisdiction, prove that §24-48.11 applies to a particular request, establish that land is a wetland, establish the wetland boundary, or prove a Class IV violation. Keep federal search doctrine, Miami-Dade inspection authority, and Florida wetland methodology as separate legal questions.
27. If DERM obtains evidence through lawful compulsory entry, challenge the evidence — not the lawful process. Ask which §62-340.300 pathway was used, who performed each observation, where the observations were taken, what vegetation was evaluated, what soil indicators were found, what hydrologic evidence was documented, what GPS coordinates establish the boundary, whether an altered-site provision is being invoked, and how the alleged activity was placed inside the asserted regulated area.
28. Keep the pre-enforcement record separate from the evidence created later. Maintain a chronology showing what DERM possessed when it issued the original violation and what it obtained only after the owner denied voluntary entry and compulsory inspection occurred. A later lawful inspection may create evidence DERM can attempt to use, but it does not rewrite the historical question of what factual and scientific basis supported the accusation when enforcement began.
29. At the 8CC hearing, prevent “home rule” and “a judge issued a warrant” from becoming substitutes for proof. Keep the questions separate: Does Miami-Dade possess the local authority it claims? Does the precise Chapter 24 provision apply? Was compulsory inspection lawfully authorized and kept within its scope? Is the land legally a wetland under the statewide methodology? Where is the boundary? What activity occurred? Did it occur inside that boundary? Was a Class IV permit legally required? Does an agricultural protection or exception affect the charged activity? Each proposition should stand on its own evidence.
30. Preserve both the home-rule issue and the compulsory-entry issue for review. If the hearing officer accepts DERM's local-authority position or relies on evidence obtained through compulsory entry, preserve the distinctions clearly. The objection is not that Miami-Dade necessarily lacks all home-rule power or that a valid warrant may be disregarded; it is that home rule, inspection authority, a warrant, and the open-fields doctrine each answer different questions and none automatically proves the statewide wetland methodology, the parcel boundary, or the elements of the charged violation.

The defensive principle is straightforward:

Home-rule authority, agricultural protections, voluntary-entry refusal, inspection authority, the Chapter 933 affidavit and warrant process, the federal open-fields doctrine, and the ultimate wetland merits are separate questions. The owner does not voluntarily create DERM's missing field record; DERM must identify its authority and the factual basis for compulsory access, and if a valid warrant or court order issues, the owner complies while preserving every objection. Neither home rule, an inspection request, an inspection warrant, nor the open-fields doctrine independently proves wetland status or a Class IV violation. DERM must still prove the applicable Rule 62-340 pathway, the wetland boundary, the location of the charged activity, and every element of the alleged Chapter 24 violation.

Educational Scenario 6 — DERM Invokes Miami-Dade Home Rule Chapter 24 / §24-48, Then Seeks Entry

For educational purposes only. Not legal advice.

Assume the same agricultural/home-rule facts developed in Scenarios 3 and 4, but fix DERM’s position at the outset. Miami-Dade DERM asserts that it is enforcing Miami-Dade’s home-rule Code of Ordinances, Chapter 24, particularly §24-48, because it alleges that clearing, farming, filling, grading, drainage work, or other activity occurred in a wetland without the required Class IV permit. The owner disputes that the charged area has been legally established as wetland, preserves the agricultural and USDA/NRCS issues, and does not voluntarily consent to an onsite inspection. DERM then relies on §24-48.11 for inspection authority and, if voluntary access is not provided, may seek compulsory process under Florida Chapter 933 or another court order, while also potentially invoking the federal open-fields doctrine as to outdoor land.

Scenario 6 therefore begins with Chapter 24 / §24-48 as DERM’s asserted local enforcement authority. The defense does not waste time asking whether DERM is enforcing a state ERP program. Instead, it asks what Chapter 24 / §24-48 actually requires DERM to prove, what separate authority supports physical entry, whether every requirement of any inspection-warrant process is satisfied, and whether the resulting evidence ultimately proves a wetland and boundary under Florida’s binding statewide methodology. NO ENTRY means no voluntary consent; valid compulsory process is obeyed while objections are preserved.

Scenario 6 authority spine: Miami-Dade Code §24-48.11; Fla. Stat. §§933.20, 933.21, 933.22, 933.23, 933.24, 933.25, 933.26, 933.27, 933.28, and 933.30; Camara v. Municipal Court; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.; Oliver v. United States / open fields; and the continuing §§373.421, 373.4211, and Rule 62-340 merits requirements.

1. DERM's asserted enforcement authority is Chapter 24 / §24-48. Begin with the County's own theory rather than asking it to choose another program. Miami-Dade's Class IV materials state that a Class IV permit is required before performing work in wetlands under Chapter 24-48. The owner can therefore force the County to prove the factual predicates that make §24-48 applicable: a legally supportable wetland, a supportable boundary, the charged activity, its location within that boundary, and the particular permit requirement allegedly violated.
2. Home rule answers the source of local regulation; it does not prove the wetland. DERM's invocation of Miami-Dade home rule and Chapter 24 can establish the local regulatory framework it relies upon, but those words do not themselves establish that the disputed land is wetland. The wetland predicate remains a separate factual and scientific question.
3. §373.421 still binds Miami-Dade on wetland definition and delineation. Florida's statewide wetland definition and delineation methodology are binding on local governments. The County may enforce Chapter 24, but it may not replace the statewide methodology with a separate local definition, a GIS label, a general regional map, or the mere fact that a Class IV violation was alleged.
4. §373.4211 and Rule 62-340 remain the scientific merits framework. Require DERM to identify the exact Rule 62-340.300 pathway relied upon, the reliable information used, and the scientific reasoning establishing the asserted boundary. The methodology is pathway-specific. The County's home-rule authority and the wetland science must remain separate.
5. Reject circular §24-48 reasoning. Do not allow 'a Class IV permit was required because this is wetland' to become 'this must be wetland because a Class IV permit was required.' The permit allegation cannot serve as its own proof of the jurisdictional wetland predicate.
6. Preserve the agricultural overlay without changing DERM's asserted source of authority. The landowner may still preserve §193.461 agricultural classification, §163.3162, the Right to Farm Act, §373.406(2), FDACS issues, USDA/NRCS materials, prior-converted-cropland evidence, soils information, and farm history. DERM may answer that Chapter 24 remains independently enforceable; that dispute should be preserved without letting it replace the separate wetland-methodology issue.
7. When DERM asks to enter, move immediately from §24-48 to §24-48.11. The enforcement provision and the inspection provision perform different functions. DERM may allege a §24-48 wetland/Class IV violation, but the physical-entry question is governed by the inspection authority it invokes, beginning with §24-48.11.
8. §24-48.11(1) is DERM's general local inspection language. Section 24-48.11(1) states that a duly authorized Department representative may enter and inspect property, premises, or a place - except a building - on or at which work is located or is being conducted, at a reasonable time to determine compliance with Article IV or Department rules. Require DERM to identify the alleged 'work,' the factual nexus to this parcel, the inspection purpose, requested scope, personnel, and credentials.
9. Keep §24-48.11(2) separate. Subsection (2) concerns periodic inspections during work for which a permit has actually been issued. If no Class IV permit was issued, subsection (2)'s permit-compliance inspection mechanism is not the source of authority. That does not by itself defeat subsection (1) or another lawful route; it simply prevents an unissued permit from being treated as permit-based consent.
10. NO ENTRY means no voluntary consent. The owner does not voluntarily consent to entry, sampling, testing, photography, surveying, vegetation analysis, soil examination, hydrology investigation, or wetland delineation. The owner does not physically resist lawful process. If DERM claims authority notwithstanding nonconsent, require identification of the legal basis, factual predicate, purpose, scope, personnel, credentials, and any judicial process.
11. Florida §933.20 defines the inspection-warrant vehicle. If DERM seeks compulsory environmental inspection through Chapter 933, §933.20 defines the inspection warrant as the written judicial order directed to a state or local official commanding an inspection authorized by state or local law relating to environmental, land-use, zoning, safety, health, and similar standards.
12. §933.21 makes the affidavit mandatory. An inspection warrant may issue only upon cause supported by affidavit. The affidavit must particularly describe the place, dwelling, structure, or premises to be inspected and the inspection purpose. It must also state that consent was sought and refused, or state facts or circumstances reasonably justifying why consent was not first sought.
13. The §933.21 affidavit becomes the central document to audit. Identify the affiant, personal knowledge, source and date of every material assertion, complaints, photographs, maps, aerials, observations, alleged work, and the facts connecting those matters to the parcel. Separate facts from conclusions such as 'wetland,' 'wetland fill,' 'regulated work,' and 'Class IV violation.'
14. The affidavit must be tested against DERM's existing record. If DERM had already issued an NOV or citation before seeking entry, compare the affidavit with the evidence DERM possessed at that earlier time. The key question is what preexisting facts supported the County's asserted reason to believe that the condition it now seeks to investigate actually existed.
15. §933.22 sets the preliminary cause standard. Cause may exist through qualifying reasonable legislative or administrative inspection standards or through reason to believe a condition of nonconformity exists that would violate a covered law or rule. DERM does not necessarily have to complete the entire Rule 62-340 case before a warrant may issue, but a conclusory wetland label can still be challenged if the affidavit does not disclose the facts supporting it.
16. §933.23 requires judicial examination under oath. The judge must examine the applicant and any other witness under oath and determine that grounds exist for the requested inspection warrant. Preserve what facts were actually presented under oath and whether those facts satisfy the statutory ground DERM relied upon.
17. §933.24 controls place, purpose, and limitations. The warrant must particularly describe the property to be inspected and designate the purpose and limitations of the inspection. Preserve the warrant and compare actual inspection activity with its terms. Authority to inspect one condition or area should not silently expand into unrelated searches or evidence collection.
18. §933.25 imposes the 14-day duration. The warrant is effective for the period stated but ordinarily may not exceed 14 days unless extended or renewed by the issuing judge on the required finding. It must be executed and returned within the authorized period; an unexecuted warrant is void after expiration.
19. §933.26 controls execution, timing, notice, and forcible entry. The statute generally restricts nighttime, weekend, holiday, and unattended execution unless judicially authorized under the statutory showing. It also limits forcible entry. When consent was previously sought and refused, the statute generally requires at least 24 hours' notice that a warrant has issued before execution, subject to the statutory emergency exception.
20. §933.27 means comply with a valid warrant. The project's NO ENTRY rule ends at voluntary consent. Once a valid Chapter 933 warrant authorizes the inspection, the owner complies. Objections to applicability, issuance, scope, execution, constitutional compliance, methodology, and evidentiary sufficiency are preserved through lawful procedures rather than physical resistance.
21. §933.28 addresses malicious or knowing procurement without cause. The statute penalizes malicious or knowing procurement of an inspection warrant without cause and malicious execution for purposes outside the act. A disputed affidavit is not automatically unlawful, but the statute makes the truthfulness of the supporting process and the legitimacy of its purpose material.
22. §933.30 restricts specified post-inspection uses. The statute limits specified later actions by a person performing an inspection under Chapter 933, including acting as a confidential informer, testifying as a witness, or executing an affidavit as a predicate for certain criminal-search activity. If an administrative inspection begins feeding a criminal investigation, examine this provision closely.
23. Camara supplies the administrative-inspection constitutional baseline. Camara v. Municipal Court recognizes that administrative inspections of constitutionally protected premises implicate the Fourth Amendment and rejects the idea that an ordinance's right-of-entry language automatically eliminates constitutional process. It also recognizes that administrative probable cause differs from criminal probable cause.
24. Marshall v. Barlow's extends that principle to protected commercial working areas. Barlow's supports requiring proper administrative-warrant process where nonpublic commercial or working premises receive Fourth Amendment protection, while recognizing that the agency does not have to prove the entire underlying violation before inspection.
25. Oliver defines the federal open-fields limitation. Oliver v. United States holds that open fields do not receive the same federal Fourth Amendment protection as houses and constitutionally protected curtilage. Fences, seclusion, and 'No Trespassing' signs do not by themselves create a federal Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in an open field.
26. Open fields does not give DERM Chapter 24 jurisdiction. Oliver answers a federal Fourth Amendment privacy question. It does not itself establish that §24-48 applies, does not itself establish §24-48.11's factual predicates, does not authorize entry into buildings or protected curtilage, and does not prove that land is wetland.
27. Open fields also does not prove a Class IV violation. Even if the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant for a particular open field, DERM still has to establish the local statutory and factual basis for the enforcement case. The absence of a federal privacy expectation is not proof of a wetland, a boundary, a regulated activity, or a permit violation.
28. Separate Gate 1 from Gate 2. Gate 1 is authority or cause to inspect: §24-48.11, Chapter 933, another court order, or another lawful mechanism. Gate 2 is proof of the actual violation: the applicable Rule 62-340 pathway, the wetland boundary, the location and nature of the charged activity, the permit requirement, and the applicable hearing burden. A ruling at Gate 1 is not a merits ruling at Gate 2.
29. Maintain a pre-enforcement versus post-entry chronology. Column A should contain everything DERM possessed before the NOV, citation, request for entry, or warrant application. Column B should contain evidence created after lawful inspection. Later evidence may be usable, but the chronology prevents later-created material from obscuring what DERM actually knew when enforcement began.
30. After lawful inspection, demand the complete Rule 62-340 record. Demand the exact pathway, observations, dates, personnel, credentials, coordinates, sampling points, photographs and metadata, vegetation evidence, soils evidence, hydrologic evidence, altered-site analysis if invoked, aerials, historical information, calculations, maps, and the scientific reasoning connecting the evidence to the asserted wetland boundary.
31. At the 8CC hearing, keep authority, entry, wetland proof, and the charged violation separate. Require distinct findings on the source of Chapter 24 / §24-48 enforcement authority; the authority and scope for entry; compliance with any warrant or order; whether the evidence establishes the wetland and boundary under §373.421, §373.4211, and Rule 62-340; and whether the charged activity occurred within that proven area and violated the specific provision alleged.
32. Preserve the chain for review. Preserve the Chapter 24 / §24-48 theory, §24-48.11 inspection theory, written nonconsent, §933.21 affidavit, §933.22 cause, §933.23 sworn examination, §933.24 scope, §933.25 timing, §933.26 execution and notice, §933.27 compliance, §933.28 procurement, §933.30 restrictions, open-fields issue, evidence chronology, Rule 62-340 pathway, wetland boundary, agricultural issues, and the hearing officer's rulings.

The Scenario 6 principle is straightforward:

DERM's asserted enforcement starting point is Miami-Dade home-rule Chapter 24 / §24-48. That fixes the local regulatory theory; it does not prove the wetland. When DERM seeks physical access, the analysis moves to §24-48.11 and, if Chapter 933 is used, to the mandatory affidavit and warrant requirements of §§933.20-.30. Camara and Barlow's govern constitutionally protected administrative inspections; Oliver limits federal Fourth Amendment protection in open fields. But open fields does not itself grant Chapter 24 jurisdiction or prove a wetland. After any lawful inspection, DERM must still prove the wetland and boundary under §373.421, §373.4211, and Rule 62-340, place the charged activity within that proven area, and establish every element of the alleged Chapter 24 / §24-48 violation. NO ENTRY means no voluntary consent; valid compulsory process is obeyed while objections are preserved.

Authority note: Miami-Dade's current Class IV permit page states that a Class IV permit is required before work in wetlands under Chapter 24-48. Miami-Dade Code §24-48.11 separately contains the inspection language. Florida's 2026 Chapter 933 contains the inspection-warrant provisions discussed above, and §§373.421 and 373.4211 make the statewide wetland methodology binding on local governments.